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DEREK W. BLACK*
Public school funding plummeted following the Great Recession and failed to
recover over the next decade, prompting strikes and protests across the nation.
Courts have done almost nothing to stop the decline. While a majority of state
supreme courts recognize a constitutional right to an adequate or equal education,
they increasingly struggle to enforce the right. That right is now approaching a
tipping point. Either it evolves, or risks becoming irrelevant.
In the past, courts have focused almost exclusively on the adequacy and equity of
funding for at-risk students, demanding that states provide more resources. Courts
have failed to ask the equally important question of why states refuse to provide the
necessary resources. As a result, states have never stopped engaging in the behavior
that leads to the funding failures in the first place.
This Article argues that states refuse to fully fund low-income students’ education
because they have ulterior aims and biases—maintaining privilege for suburban
schools, lowering taxes for wealthy individuals, and not “wasting” money on low-
income kids. States go to extraordinary lengths to manipulate school funding for-
mulas to achieve these ends. Thus, the various policies that produce inequality and
inadequacy are not just benign state failures; they are intentional efforts to gerry-
mander educational opportunity. Understood this way, school funding manipula-
tions violate federal equal protection and state constitutional rights to education.
Reframing school funding failures as gerrymandering can both create a much-
needed federal check on educational inequality and reinvigorate the enforcement of
state constitutional rights to education.
* Copyright © 2019 by Derek W. Black, Professor of Law, University of South
Carolina School of Law. I would like to thank Dean Robert Wilcox for supporting my
research; Ned Snow for his incredible insights and edits; Annie Eisenberg, Ben Means, and
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research; Vanessa McQuinn for her proof reading; and Bruce Norton for his research
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INTRODUCTION
Public school funding is in worse condition than it has been in
decades. In real dollar terms, school funding in most states is lower
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today than it was before the 2008 recession.1 Some states are twenty
to thirty percent below pre-recession levels.2 While minor budget
adjustments may be theoretically innocuous, studies show that funding
cuts of this scale depress student achievement.3 In fact, one of the
most comprehensive studies to date shows that twenty percent vari-
ances in school funding account for half of the black-white graduation
gap.4 Analyzing its own data, one state found that “a 1% increase in
student performance was associated with a .83% increase in
spending.”5 Notwithstanding these robust findings, states consistently
fund education well below the levels that disadvantaged students need
to achieve acceptable academic outcomes.6 School funding has gotten
so bad that teachers went on strike and led mass protests across the
nation in the spring of 2018.7 A year later, problems remained. In
1 MICHAEL LEACHMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MOST STATES
HAVE CUT SCHOOL FUNDING, AND SOME CONTINUE CUTTING 1 (2016) (finding that thirty
one states were still funding education below pre-recession levels).
2 MICHAEL LEACHMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, A PUNISHING
DECADE FOR SCHOOL FUNDING 5 (2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-
tax/a-punishing-decade-for-school-funding (finding that Arizona was 36.6% below 2008
funding levels and Florida and Alabama more than 20% below).
3 See, e.g., BRUCE D. BAKER, ALBERT SHANKER INST., REVISITING THAT AGE-OLD
QUESTION: DOES MONEY MATTER IN EDUCATION? 1 (2012), http://www.shankerinstitute.
org/sites/shanker/files/moneymatters_edition2.pdf (surveying all the relevant studies and
finding a consensus that money matters for student outcomes); C. Kirabo Jackson et al.,
Do School Spending Cuts Matter? Evidence from the Great Recession 21 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24203, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24203
(“[A] $1000 decline in per-pupil spending reduced test scores by about 0.045o´ and reduced
college-going rates by about 3 percentage points.”).
4 See, e.g., C. Kirabo Jackson et al., The Effect of School Finance Reforms on the
Distribution of Spending, Academic Achievement, and Adult Outcomes 15–17 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20118, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w20118 (finding that school funding litigation had reduced school funding inequalities).
Funding variances, if maintained over time, equate with nearly a year’s worth of learning
for low-income students. Id. Relying on a different methodolgy, another study found
similarly robust evidence of the positive effects of school funding reforms on student
achievement across time. See Julien Lafortune et al., School Finance Reform and the
Distribution of Student Achievement, AMER. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 1, 24 (Apr. 2018),
https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/app.20160567 (comparing its results to those
produced by Jackson et al., supra).
5 Gannon v. State (Gannon IV), 390 P.3d 461, 493 (Kan. 2017) (citing Kansas’s own
legislative study of school funding in the state: LEGISLATIVE POST AUDIT, STATE OF KAN.,
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN KANSAS: ESTIMATING THE COSTS OF K-12
EDUCATION USING TWO APPROACHES (2006), http://www.kslpa.org/media/files/highlights/
media/files/temp/05pa19_nomfJG1.pdf).
6 See BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., EDUC. LAW CTR., THE REAL SHAME OF THE NATION:
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTERSTATE INEQUITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOL
INVESTMENTS 1 (2018) (calculating the funding gap between what students would need to
achieve “average” academic outcomes and what states currently spend on students).
7 See, e.g., Moriah Balingit, Fed Up with School Spending Cuts, Oklahoma Teachers
Walk Out, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/
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January 2019, teachers in the nation’s second largest school district
went on strike for the first time in three decades and teachers in other
states followed suit with their own protests.8
In the past, advocates have challenged school funding inadequa-
cies and inequities as deprivations of students’ state constitutional
right to education. Since the 1970s, advocates have won more than
half of the time.9 But courtroom victories have not stopped inadequa-
cies and inequities from reoccurring. Ironically, the more plaintiffs win
the more things seem to stay the same. States often quickly slip back
into their bad habits or, even worse, never fully implement an effec-
tive remedy in the first instance.10 Either way, another round of litiga-
tion ensues, and the process repeats itself.11
This perpetual struggle stems from two unmitigated problems.
First, states go to extreme lengths to manipulate and obfuscate the
way in which they fund public schools.12 They use funding formulas
that are so complex that only experts fully understand them.13
wp/2018/04/02/fed-up-with-school-spending-cuts-oklahoma-teachers-prepare-to-walk-out;
Simon Romero et al., Teachers in Arizona and Colorado Walk Out Over Education
Funding, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/us/teacher-
walkout-arizona-colorado.html.
8 Jennifer Medina et al., Los Angeles Teachers Strike, Disrupting Classes for 500,000
Students, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/lausd-
teachers-strike.html; Matthew S. Schwartz, West Virginia’s Education Bill Dies as Teachers
Strike, NPR (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/19/695856032/w-va-teachers-go-
on-strike-over-state-education-bill; Holly Yan, Thousands of North and South Carolina
Teachers Are Protesting—but Not Just for the Reasons You Might Think, CNN (May 1,
2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/01/us/south-carolina-teachers-protest-may-1/
index.html.
9 Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1500–05 (2007) (finding plaintiffs had
won sixty percent of the time in school funding litigation as of 2007); see also John Dayton
& Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the War?, 57 VAND. L. REV.
2351, 2353 (2004) (“To date, the highest courts in thirty-six states have issued opinions on
the merits of funding litigation suits, with nineteen courts upholding state funding systems
and seventeen declaring the systems unconstitutional.”).
10 See generally Dayton & Dupre, supra note 9, at 2406 (“[A]dequate reform is not
guaranteed merely by ‘success’ in litigation. . . . [A]fter several years of serial litigation and
little progress, these cases sometimes represent little more than a confirmation of the
futility of reform where political will is lacking.”).
11 Id.
12 See, e.g., Gannon v. State (Gannon V), 402 P.3d 513, 525–29 (Kan. 2017) (explaining
the unusual methods and data inputs the state had used to develop its formula); DeRolph
v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 737–38 (Ohio 1997) (examining seven different funding formula
inequities).
13 See generally MATTHEW M. CHINGOS & KRISTIN BLAGG, URB. INST., MAKING SENSE
OF STATE SCHOOL FUNDING POLICY (2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
publication/94961/making-sense-of-state-school-funding-policy_0.pdf; How Do School
Funding Formulas Work?, URB. INST. (Nov. 29, 2017), https://apps.urban.org/features/
funding-formulas (exploring the multiple aspects of how states tend to build a funding
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Embedded in those formulas are the tools by which to advantage and
disadvantage particular communities and ensure that the state never
fully absorbs the cost of providing a decent education for all students.
States, for instance, pick arbitrarily low estimates of education costs,
exclude inflation increases, cap or exclude supplements for low-
income and special education students, and shift costs onto local dis-
tricts that they know the districts cannot afford.14
Second, courts and litigants fail to appreciate the significance of
these manipulations because they ignore an important question—
motive. School funding litigation focuses almost exclusively on out-
comes.15 It asks whether students have received an adequate or equal
education, which entails an intense factual analysis of how students
are performing and what they need to improve.16 But courts and liti-
gants never stop to ask why states are failing to provide the resources
students need. It is enough, they assume, to find that states have failed
and then demand a remedy. Those remedies, however, rarely account
for the source of the problem: states’ propensity to actively manipu-
late school funding.
This Article is the first to offer a much-needed normative and
doctrinal reconceptualization of school funding failures and their
effects on educational opportunity. Drawing on increasing concerns
with politically motivated manipulation of voting districts,17 the
formula); Regina Mack, Lawmakers, Education Leaders Discuss School Finance in Texas,
TEX. TRIB. (May 4, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/05/04/school-finance-reform
(discussing the difficulty of statewide school finance reform because “many legislators” do
not understand school funding and “don’t understand what’s at stake”).
14 See infra Part I.
15 James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV.
1223, 1240–43 (2008) (focusing on comparing the court’s narrow definitions of adequacy
and the examination of school resources and student outcomes).
16 Cf. William S. Koski, Beyond Dollars? The Promises and Pitfalls of the Next
Generation of Educational Rights Litigation, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1907 (2017)
(positing that these evaluations are so difficult that courts have grown weary of enforcing
adequacy and equity claims).
17 See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
2652, 2659 (2015) (upholding a voter referendum that removed redistricting decisions from
the legislature and assigned them to an independent commission); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267, 293 (2004) (demonstrating a situation in which all nine Justices agreeing that
“excessive injections of politics” in redistricting violates the Constitution); see also
Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (striking down political
gerrymandering based on the Court’s recent jurisprudence), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934
(2018). To the extent the U.S. Supreme Court is unusure of the appropriate remedy for
these political gerrymanders, state courts are acting in its stead. See, e.g., Michael Wines &
Richard Fausset, North Carolina’s Legislative Maps Are Thrown Out by State Court Panel,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/us/north-carolina-
gerrymander-unconstitutional.html (writing that a North Carolina state court panel’s
decision to throw out that state’s legislative maps suggested that state courts could act
against partisan gerrymandering even in the face of the Supreme Court’s decision that
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Article reframes the various policies that produce educational ine-
quality and inadequacy not just as benign state failures but as inten-
tional efforts to gerrymander educational opportunity. Based on that
reframing, this Article argues that gerrymandering educational
funding can rise to the level of unconstitutionality.
Rather than honestly attempt to fairly fund basic educational
opportunities, some states decide how much they are willing to spend
on education and then work backward to create a funding formula
that will match the state’s arbitrary budget goals.18 More distressing,
states insert precise values into their funding formulas that ensure
privileged districts maintain, if not expand, their privilege.19 Ques-
tioning or rejecting the notion that additional money will help disad-
vantaged students, states use a similar method to ensure that the state
will not have to absorb the full cost of educating low-income and
minority students.20 The current U.S. Secretary of Education has even
egged them on, saying that “[t]he notion that spending more money is
going to bring about different results is ill-placed and ill-advised.”21
States’ school funding inadequacies and inequities are not acci-
dental but calculated and illicit attempts to underfund the education
federal courts could not); Zachary Roth, Opinion, We’re Winning the Fight Against
Gerrymandering, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.
org/blog/we-are-winning-fight-against-gerrymandering (“[The] North Carolina decision
was the eighth straight anti-gerrymandering ruling by a state or lower federal court,
underscoring just what an outlier the high court’s ruling really is.”).
18 See, e.g., Gannon V, 402 P.3d 513, 533 (Kan. 2017) (finding the state had worked
backward in its estimates of local contributions); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 738
(Ohio 1997) (positing that the state had “work[ed] backward”).
19 See, e.g., Emma Brown, In 23 States, Richer School Districts Get More Local Funding
than Poorer Districts , WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2015/03/12/in-23-states-richer-school-districts-get-
more-local-funding-than-poorer-districts.
20 See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 56 (N.Y. 2006)
(selecting the lowest estimate of student need to drive its funding formula); DeRolph, 677
N.E.2d at 738–39 (freezing the aid for concentrated poverty once it reaches 20%). A
survey of student funding policies reveals that almost all states fail to provide the
additional 30% to 40% in funding that low income students would need to achieve
adequate outcomes. See EDBUILD, FUNDED: STUDENT POVERTY FUNDING POLICIES IN
EACH STATE (2016) [hereinafter STUDENT POVERTY FUNDING]; NAT’L CTR. EDUC. OF
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., INEQUALITIES IN PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT REVENUES
62 (1998) (identifying 40% as the appropriate adjustment for low-income students).
21 Kayla Lattimore, DeVos Says More Money Won’t Help Schools; Research Says
Otherwise, NPR (June 9, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/06/09/
531908094/devos-says-more-money-wont-help-schools-research-says-otherwise. DeVos is
far from the first high level leader to suggest as much. See, e.g., Susan Chira, Spending and
Learning: Money’s Role Questioned in Schools Debate, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 1991), https://
www.nytimes.com/1991/05/04/us/spending-and-learning-money-s-role-questioned-in-
schools-debate.html (noting that former President George H. W. Bush once said “[d]ollar
bills don’t educate students”). The overwhelming weight of evidence demonstrates that
money clearly does matter. BAKER, supra note 3.
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of some students and get away with it—what this Article terms gerry-
mandering. Gerrymandering school funding to target particular stu-
dents for disfavor is inconsistent with any reasonable normative
concept of equal educational opportunity for all.22 Rather than lev-
eling the playing field or allowing individual merit to dictate out-
comes, gerrymandering school funding disadvantages certain
communities and students.23 Courts and advocates, however, have
overlooked this root cause and motive for education underfunding. In
doing so, they have implicitly invited states to continue their illicit
behavior, which inevitably reproduces bad outcomes. This Article pro-
vides a solution, explaining how gerrymandering school funding to
advantage and disadvantage students is unconstitutional, regardless of
the precise adequacy and equity outcomes it produces.
Under both state and federal constitutional law, educational ger-
rymandering that disadvantages students should fail for a simple
reason: The state’s goals, when properly understood, are illegitimate.24
This Article demonstrates that school funding gerrymanders rarely
represent good faith efforts to improve educational opportunities or
meet state constitutional obligations to provide adequate and equal
22 Courts have found that state’s educational duty to ensure access for all is an absolute
one. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 495 (Ark. 2002),
abrogated for noncompliance, Morgan v. State, 142 S.W.3d 643 (Ark. 2004) (per curiam)
(“[The state constitution] imposes upon the State an absolute constitutional duty to
educate our children.”); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 794 A.2d 744, 754 (N.H. 2002)
(“As we have repeatedly held, it is the State’s duty to guarantee the funding necessary to
provide a constitutionally adequate education to every educable child in the public schools
in the State.”); Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 485 (N.J. 1998) (recognizing the state has an
affirmative duty in addressing educational deficiencies).
23 The act of stacking the deck or, in the case of voting, gerrymandering a government
process strikes many as normatively unconscionable. A Wisconsin legislator captured it
perfectly with the statement that “legislators are picking their constituents rather than
constituents picking their legislators.” Nina Totenberg, This Supreme Court Case Could
Radically Reshape Politics, NPR (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/03/552904504/
this-supreme-court-case-could-radically-reshape-politics. The government should no more
“pick” who gets a decent education than it should pick its voters. The behavior is simply
contrary to our form of government and the rule of law. Michael S. Kang, Gerrymandering
and the Constitutional Norm Against Government Partisanship, 116 MICH. L. REV. 351,
353–54 (2017); Justin Levitt, Intent Is Enough: Invidious Partisanship in Redistricting, 59
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1993, 2023–24 (2018).
24 Even budgetary constraints—real or imagined—fail to rise to the level of a
legitimate excuse for school funding failures. See, e.g., Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1243
(Cal. 1992) (rejecting budgetary shortfalls or challenges as a justification for failure to
discharge constitutional education duties); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989) (same); Claremont Sch. Dist., 794 A.2d at 754 (same); Abbott v.
Burke, 798 A.2d 602, 603–04 (N.J. 2002) (same); Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d
1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995) (same); see also Michael A. Rebell, Safeguarding the Right to a
Sound Basic Education in Times of Fiscal Constraint, 75 ALA. L. REV. 1855, 1859–60
(2012) (analyzing financial exigency school funding cases). This Article argues that real
exigencies cannot explain most states’ behavior.
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education. Rather, states’ primary motives are often to favor schools
in privileged communities, lower taxes for the wealthy, avoid their
constitutional duty in education, and stop spending what they incor-
rectly believe to be wasted money on low-income kids.25
Under federal equal protection, these motives—when understood
as attempts to disadvantage particular groups—cannot be ends unto
themselves. Even rational basis review provides a limit to this type of
behavior. Over the course of several cases, the Court has emphasized
that intentionally targeting groups for disadvantage simply because
the state does not like or value them is illegitimate, even if the
targeted group is not a suspect class.26
School funding gerrymandering triggers this concern. At the most
general level, state funding policies make it harder for some students
to access their right to an adequate or equal education.27 At a more
granular level, the depth and scope of the gerrymandering embedded
in state funding formulas makes little sense other than as state efforts
to advantage privileged suburban school districts and disadvantage
low-income and minority school districts. When school funding gerry-
mandering simply singles out groups rather than achieving some legiti-
mate educational goal, it violates the basic promise of equal
protection.
The targeting of communities and students also violates state con-
stitutions because it is logically inconsistent with states’ affirmative
constitutional duty to provide an adequate or equal educational
opportunity to all students.28 A state cannot, in good faith, carry out
25 See infra Part II.
26 The Court has held that “a bare . . . desire to harm,” “disadvantage,” or “singl[e]
out” a group is illicit regardless of the level of scrutiny employed. Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 685, 632–33 (1996) (citations omitted); see, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). This principle lies at the heart of the Constitution. Both
the rule of law and equal protection demand that government be “impartial . . . to all who
seek its assistance.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. Government cannot make it “more difficult
for one group of citizens than for all others” to access government benefits, services, or
protection. Id. In these cases, the Court also focuses on the “peculiar” and “unusual”
nature of the state’s actions. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 754 (2013);
Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–32; Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37–38
(1928). States’ unusual efforts are themselves indicative of a desire to disadvantage a
group.
27 See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., More Than 40% of Low-Income
Schools Don’t Get a Fair Share of State and Local Funds, Department of Education
Research Finds (Nov. 30, 2011), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/more-40-low-
income-schools-dont-get-fair-share-state-and-local-funds-department-education-research-
finds (explaining the extent of resource inequality in the nation’s schools).
28 Several state constitutions, for instance, require the provision of a “uniform” system
of public education. EMILY PARKER, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, CONSTITUTIONAL
OBLIGATIONS FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION (2016), https://www.ecs.org/wp-content/uploads/
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this constitutional duty while at the same time putting certain students
at a disadvantage. A more complicated legal analysis arises when
states obfuscate their motives under the guise of separation of powers,
asserting that the legislature has the discretion to fund education as it
deems fit.29 States are correct that their constitutions afford legisla-
tures wide discretion in the implementation of education policy, but
the doctrinal response must be to distinguish active resistance to a
constitutional duty from the exercise of discretion.30 Legislatures can
freely exercise discretion in the context of good faith efforts to dis-
charge their constitutional duty, but that discretion does not include
the authority to reject the duty itself or act in bad faith. Legislative
resistance all too often is a refusal to accept judicial findings that
money matters for low-income students and that they need more.31
A gerrymandering framework fills several important gaps in cur-
rent strategies and doctrine—gaps that threaten to undermine the
whole movement to enforce the constitutional right to education.
First, identifying gerrymandering in school funding formulas and
labeling it as such normatively delegitimizes what has become
common practice by state legislatures. And it does so in a way that is
easier for courts and the public to grasp than amorphous labels like
educational adequacy and inequity or variations in per pupil spending
that are otherwise difficult to appreciate. Second, a gerrymandering
framework gives rise to a federal claim that is sorely missing. Absent a
federal claim, many states have had free reign to operate almost any
type of education scheme they could imagine, regardless of its effects
2016-Constitutional-obligations-for-public-education-1.pdf (identifying fifteen states with a
uniformity clause). Most state constitutions also specifically indicate that the state’s duty is
to serve “all” students. See Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee
Education, 70 STAN. L. REV. 735, 780 (2018) (analyzing the intentional inclusion of the
term “all” in constitutional education clauses).
29 See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 214 (responding to the state’s argument that the trial
court’s order to remedy educational inadequacies “is a violation of the separation of
powers”); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 88–90 (Wash. 1978) (same). For a
discussion of separation of powers and the role they play in school funding contests, see
Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational
Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701 (2010).
30 Gannon IV, 390 P.3d 461, 503–04 (Kan. 2017) (“[A]ny system of school finance
created by the legislature must comply with the Kansas Constitution. The constitution is
‘the work . . . of the people,’ and ‘is the supreme and paramount law, receiving its force
from the express will of the people.’” (citations omitted)).
31 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990) (responding to the state
claim that “additional funding will not enable the poorer urban districts to satisfy the
thorough and efficient test” and responding that “the constitutional answer is that they are
entitled to pass or fail with at least the same amount of money as their competitors”);
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 331 (N.Y. 2003) (rejecting state
argument that disadvantaged districts were already receiving sufficient funds because an
eighth grade level of learning was sufficient).
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on students.32 Third, a gerrymandering framework can be easier to
apply and enforce than adequacy and equity doctrine. Rather than
difficult qualitative and statistical evaluations regarding student
resources, student outcomes, and educational remedies,33 educational
gerrymandering involves a narrow and judicially familiar inquiry into
legislative goals and motivations.34
These advantages collectively further school funding litigation’s
ultimate goal—improving educational opportunities. Without this
framework, state courts increasingly struggle to achieve their goals.35
Constant and seemingly unresolvable fights with state legislatures are
testing state courts in ways that raise the question of whether ade-
quacy and equity litigation can remain viable over the long term.36
More bluntly, nothing less than the long-term enforceability of the
constitutional right to education hangs in the balance of its ability to
evolve.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I categorizes and details
the precise ways in which states gerrymander educational opportunity.
Part II identifies and analyzes the state motives that lead to school
funding gerrymandering. Part III explores the limits of current ade-
32 See generally Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1150 (D. Kan. 2000), aff’d,
295 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2002) (dismissing “the alleged disparities created by the local
option budgets is attributed to the varying wealths of the areas . . . because it is not the
‘constitutional prerogative’ of the federal courts ‘to nullify statewide measures for
financing public services’” (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 54 (1973))); Derek W. Black, Abandoning the Federal Role in Education: The Every
Student Succeeds Act, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1344–46 (2017) (surveying states’ poor
track record in school funding).
33 Scholars posit that these inquires have caused courts to grow “weary.” Koski, supra
note 16, at 1907 (“In the last eight years or so, courts appear to have grown more reluctant
to intervene in educational finance policy and, as a result, third-wave adequacy litigations
may be receding.”); see also Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 705, 730–31 (2012) (arguing that the indeterminacy of qualitative education standards
has resulted in both under- and over-enforcement of the Constitution).
34 See, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 861 (2005)
(“[G]overnmental purpose is a key element of a good deal of constitutional doctrine.”
(citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)));
Levitt, supra note 23, at 2011–13 (surveying more than ten constitutional contexts in which
intent is a touchstone of judicial inquiry). Scott Bauries has argued that courts should focus
on whether the legislature has acted in good faith. Bauries, supra note 33, at 761. His
theory moves in the direction of focusing litigation on legislative motive but would afford
legislatures more discretion than current doctrine allows. Thus, his thesis would involve the
judiciary less in school funding litigation whereas this Article aims to add another arrow to
courts’ quivers.
35 See generally Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding Cuts, Teacher
Shortages, and the Dwindling Commitment to Public Education, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 423,
451–59 (2016) (finding that courts grew reticent to enforce education rights following the
recession).
36 Koski, supra note 16, at 1907.
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quacy and equity litigation approaches to address this gerryman-
dering, positing that the viability of the constitutional right to
education could be at risk. Part IV details the equal protection and
state constitutional right principles that prohibit states from targeting
groups for disadvantage. Part IV closes by exploring the advantages of
this framework in comparison to adequacy and equity.
I
HOW STATES GERRYMANDER SCHOOL FUNDING
States use funding formulas to distribute widely differing levels of
funding to every district in the state.37 The complexity and nuances of
these formulas allow states to gerrymander school funding in plain
sight. Except for a handful of experts and legislative staff, no one
understands what the state is doing or its real-world impact on stu-
dents; most simply wait to be told how much funding they will receive
and hope it will be enough. For that reason, challenging the state’s
assumptions and decisions is almost out of the question.38
For the lay person, school funding formulas, in many respects,
resemble jigsaw puzzles. The state—the puzzle-maker—knows exactly
how and where to draw calculated and sharp lines, which only the
state fully appreciates. To most everyone else, the funding formula
looks like an indecipherable mess of random puzzle pieces.39 Herein
lies the rub that allows the state to manipulate the puzzle lines any
way it wants to produce as many different pieces and shapes as it
wants. Whereas the puzzle maker’s aim is to create a challenging
puzzle, the state’s objectives are often more nefarious—to keep its
costs down, maintain the status quo, or obfuscate the fact that it is not
treating students fairly. Only on rare occasions is the state’s objective
37 See generally BAKER ET AL., supra note 6, at 45 (listing per pupil expenditures by
district quintile for all states).
38 See Andrea Zelinski, Politics Block Way of Education Funding Solutions, Experts
Say: Texas Legislators Face Incentives to Perpetuate the Status Quo, HOUS. CHRON. (May
14, 2016), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/politics/texas/article/Politics-block-way-
of-education-funding-7469121.php (claiming that Texas only addresses school funding
when courts force them to do so and even then does not fix the problem); see also Jim
Allen, For School Systems, McCleary Decision Gave with One Hand and Took with the
Other, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Sept. 9, 2018), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2018/sep/09/
for-school-systems-confusion-and-angst-mix-with-re (discussing the confusion among
districts regarding how the state will spend and disperse the substantial new investment in
the school funding system).
39 See, e.g., Jessica Handy, Confused About New School Funding Reform Law?, STAND
FOR CHILDREN (Sept. 1, 2017), http://stand.org/illinois/blog/2017/09/01/confused-about-
new-school-funding-reform-law (explaining and simplifying the multi-part school funding
reform bill for the lay person).
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to ensure that all students actually have access to adequate and equal
resources.
The following sections demystify state funding formulas,
explaining their most basic levers and, more important, naming and
identifying the precise ways in which states gerrymander school
funding. Educational gerrymandering includes: arbitrarily driving
down the estimated cost of educating students; consistently picking
low supplements for at-risk students; conveniently excluding inflation
increases and other fixed costs over time; and shifting excessive and
unrealistic funding burdens onto local districts. These tactics, among
others, allow states to reduce and minimize their contribution to edu-
cation. But states sometimes go one step further.
Rather than just plug in arbitrarily low numbers and cover the
cost of whatever the formula generates, some states begin their
budgeting process by deciding how much they are willing to spend on
education. They then make up estimates and values that will require
the state to spend no more or less than that number. In short, they
work backwards. The following subsections explain and detail each of
these gerrymandering tactics.
A. Manipulating the Base
States often gerrymander school funding through the “student
base.”40 The student base is the basic minimum amount a school dis-
trict will receive from the state for each child it enrolls and, thus, the
starting point for all education funding.41 The state sets the base by
estimating the amount of money districts need from the state to pro-
vide students with access to qualified teachers, appropriate class sizes,
instructional materials, technology, and facilities.42 More specifically,
the base is the difference between the total cost of delivering those
resources and the amount the state can reasonably expect local dis-
tricts to cover themselves. If the cost of educating students is $8000
per pupil, and even the lowest-income district in the state can afford
to provide $1000 per pupil toward education, the state might set the
base at $7000 per pupil.
After arriving at that base, the state creates adjustments to fur-
ther tailor the precise amount a district receives to its local circum-
stances. The state increases or decreases the base per pupil funding
40 Two states, however, do not even use a funding formula and, thus, do not calculate a
student base cost. STUDENT POVERTY FUNDING, supra note 20 (Pennsylvania and
Connecticut).
41 EDUC. L. CTR., FUNDING, FORMULAS, AND FAIRNESS: WHAT PENNSYLVANIA CAN
LEARN FROM OTHER STATES’ EDUCATION FUNDING FORMULAS 5 (2013).
42 Id.
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based on things like geographic costs and student demographics. Put-
ting aside any manipulations that might occur in those demographic
and geographic adjustments, states routinely manipulate the base esti-
mate through a series of “fuzzy math” calculations.
The first and most manipulative tactic involves cherry-picking
data that the state knows will produce its desired result—lower educa-
tion spending. Kansas provides a poignant example. Kansas recently
estimated the cost of an adequate education in the state by examining
how much money “successful schools” spend on students.43 But
Kansas did not actually follow a legitimate method for applying this
“successful schools” model. Instead, the state rigged its study to pro-
duce an artificially low estimate of necessary per pupil expenditures.44
Rather than evaluate all its successful schools, the state cherry-picked
a subset of schools and then looked at the most successful ones in that
group.45 Many of the so-called “successful schools” in the subgroup
had low student achievement.46 Even more oddly, many of these “suc-
cessful schools” were among those that school funding plaintiffs had
recently demonstrated to be inadequately funded.47 In other words,
the schools the state chose were not really successful schools; they
were “merely the best, or the most efficient, of the constitutionally
inadequate” schools.48 By cherry-picking these schools, Kansas was
able to manufacture a low estimated base student cost and drastically
decrease its funding obligations.
The following chart49 provides a glimpse of the extent to which
Kansas has manipulated its base and its effect on the total resources
available to students. The state contribution to education varied con-
siderably between 2008 and 2015. Yet, the total funding that students
received from state, local, and federal resources combined remained
relatively constant. For instance, the state increased the state portion
of school funding from $6326 per pupil in 2010 to $8567 in 2015, but
during that same period, the required local contribution declined from
$4406 to $3456. So what might have looked like a $2000 increase in
school funding from the state amounted to something closer to a
43 Gannon V, 402 P.3d 513, 525 (Kan. 2017). A successful schools model is a plausible
method for setting a student base. Id. at 531. Experts prefer other methods. Id. at 525.
44 Id. at 529.
45 Id. at 530.
46 Id. at 528. As high as one in four students were achieving below grade level. Id.
47 Id. at 527.
48 Id.
49 This chart is based on data from the Kansas State Department of Education and the
calculations from Dave Trabert, Kansas School Funding Set New Records in 2017, KAN.
POL’Y INST. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://kansaspolicy.org/kansas-school-funding-set-new-
records-2017.
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$1000 per-pupil increase. Moreover, comparing 2009 to 2015, the
increase falls to a mere $263 per pupil.
In short, by constantly altering the state and local contributions,
the state kept the overall cost of education low and presented the pic-
ture that it was doing far more for education than it actually was in
some years.
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A second method states use to manipulate base education costs is
to adjust expenditures down under the guise of efficiency. States claim
to estimate the cost of an adequate education by relying on spending
patterns in financially efficient schools.50 But, as a practical matter,
states eliminate the possibility that they will need to increase spending
to the levels found in high-spending, high-performing districts. New
York, for instance, explicitly excluded high-spending districts from its
efficiency analysis altogether,51 removing districts in the state’s top
half of spending from its estimate of efficiently funded education.52
This approach also had the side effect of excluding half of the state’s
most academically successful schools from analysis.53
50 See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
51 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 67 (N.Y. 2006).
52 Id. at 66.
53 Id. (describing how 140 of the 281 schools that were successful in meeting state
educational benchmarks were deemed inefficient).
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Excluding districts simply because they spend above the median
is impossible to justify,54 particularly when it excludes half of the
state’s best achieving schools—the exact type of schools the state is
trying to efficiently replicate. New York’s own expert admitted that
there was no evidence that districts in the top fifty percent of spending
were inefficient.55 The state could have legitimately excluded outlier
districts—those in both the top and bottom five percent in spending.56
But the fact that the state instead took a facially arbitrary approach
suggests the state’s primary goal was to drive down the base cost of
education, not identify quality schools with efficient spending prac-
tices.57 In short, New York, like Kansas, is guilty of cherry-picking
school districts under the guise of legitimately estimating base costs.58
States, however, can also manipulate base funding through far
simpler and more obvious strategies: using old data,59 ignoring infla-
tion,60 and excluding certain costs. For instance, a state can rely on old
spending data to estimate the cost of an adequate education, knowing
that it underfunded education in those past years.61 With that data,
the state will almost necessarily produce an artificially low and inaccu-
rate estimate of adequate base costs. Or a state can do the inverse: use
current data but exclude inflation adjustments for upcoming budgets.
Even if the state’s estimate is valid for the first year, the estimate
54 Id. at 67 (discussing testimony from state’s expert who admitted he would not use the
state’s efficiency filter and that it was not “generally accepted by experts in educational
finance”).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 The court noted that only one other state in the country, New Hampshire, uses such
a method and its purposes “appear” to be “‘to drive costs down’ to a predetermined
amount.” Id.
58 Kansas, ironically, used an efficiency filter within its successful-schools model to
manipulate the base cost even further. Similar to New York, its efficiency filter indicated
that twenty six of its “successful” schools were spending more per pupil than the state
estimated they should. Gannon V, 402 P.3d 513, 528 (Kan. 2017). In other words, by the
state’s estimate, most successful schools spend too much money. This remarkable
conclusion begs the question of whether the state manipulated its analysis. The court
suggested the state did just that, emphasizing that the state had made “efficiency” a more
dominant factor than student achievement in its analysis. Id. at 527. The court also
indicated that the state had included spending data that should have been excluded and
provided no explanation for other odd data that it did include. Id.
59 See Steve LeBlanc, Massachusetts Debates 25-Year-Old Education Formula,
BOSTON.COM (July 15, 2018), https://www.boston.com/news/education/2018/07/15/
massachusetts-debates-25-year-old-education-funding-formula.
60 See Gannon v. State (Gannon VI), 420 P.3d 477, 480–81 (Kan. 2018); Montoy v.
State, 62 P.3d 228, 234 (Kan. 2003) (discussing the allegation that the state had failed to
provide for inflation increases); Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 181 P.3d 43, 48 (Wyo.
2008).
61 See Gannon V, 402 P.3d at 527.
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should increase with inflation over time.62 By excluding inflation
adjustments or intentionally underestimating the rate of inflation,
state legislatures drive down their future education base costs.63
Another variant is to accurately forecast the future cost of an ade-
quate education and the base cost of delivering it, but give the state
several years to gradually increase the base to reach those future esti-
mates.64 In other words, the state underfunds education today in
hopes of fully funding it at some later date. Underestimations and
delayed implementation save the state hundreds of millions of dol-
lars65 and thus create enormously perverse incentives.
In addition to excluding inflation or delaying implementation,
some states exclude certain education expenditures from their base
costs. During the recession, Virginia, for instance, capped the number
of support personnel positions it would fund in schools.66 By excluding
these personnel from the base funding estimate, the state dramatically
drove down its costs. In a single year, this exclusion cut $378 million
from the state’s base education funding obligation.67 Other states have
been excluding facility costs for decades, calculating base education
costs on everything but facilities.68 This exclusion places an enormous
62 See Gannon IV, 390 P.3d 461, 470 (Kan. 2017); Davis v. State, 804 N.W.2d 618, 630
(S.D. 2011).
63 See Gannon VI, 420 P.3d at 480–81 (excluding inflation); Campbell Cty., 181 P.3d at
48 (discussing plaintiffs’ claims that the state had excluded inflation and other cost
adjustments and plaintiffs’ trial court victory). Estimating future inflation is inherently
speculative, making it easy for a state to estimate downward. See generally JAMES H.
STOCK & MARK W. WATSON, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH, WHY HAS U.S.
INFLATION BECOME HARDER TO FORECAST? (2006) (discussing difficulties in forecasting
inflation).
64 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 57 (N.Y. 2006).
65 Economists project a 2.25% inflation rate over the next five years. If the estimated
cost of an adequate education today is $7500, the projected base rate should be $8382 in
five years. But if the state estimates 2% inflation, that number falls to $8280, amounting to
roughly $40,000 in an average school—two-thirds the cost of the median teacher’s salary
and far more than the median salary of a teacher’s aid. Teacher Assistants, U.S. DEP’T
LABOR, BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS (BLS), https://www.bls.gov/ooh/education-training-
and-library/teacher-assistants.htm; Kindergarten and Elementary School Teachers, U.S.
DEP’T LABOR, BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS (BLS), https://www.bls.gov/ooh/education-
training-and-library/kindergarten-and-elementary-school-teachers.htm.
66 VA. BD. OF EDUC., VIRGINIA BOARD OF EDUCATION’S 2016 ANNUAL REPORT ON
THE CONDITION AND NEEDS OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN VIRGINIA 16 (2016) [hereinafter VA.
2016 ANNUAL REPORT], http://www.doe.virginia.gov/boe/reports/annual_reports/2016.pdf.
67 Id. at 16.
68 See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997); Abbeville v. State, 355
S.C. 58, 68 (1999); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 882 (W. Va. 1979); Jones v. State Bd.,
927 So. 2d 426, 429 (La. Ct. App. 2005). The longer a school defers repairs, the higher the
cost gets and the more into disrepair a facility falls. See DEBBIE ALEXANDER & LAURIE
LEWIS, INST. OF EDUC. SCIS. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, CONDITION OF
AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOL FACILITIES: 2012–2013, at 6 tbl.1 (2014) (noting thirty-one
percent of schools nationwide rely on temporary buildings, with fourty-five percent of
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hardship on low-income school districts and progressively worsens as
each year passes.69 Without state funding, these districts may never be
in a position to repair their facilities or, as is eventually needed, build
a new school.70
States can be remarkably creative about manipulating the base.
For example, Texas recently adopted a distinct but related scheme to
those already outlined above. In 2004, Texas capped the number of
special education students for whom it would provide funding.71 No
matter how many special education students a district enrolled, Texas
would only fund special education services for 8.5% of a school dis-
trict’s students.72 Nationally, 13% of students require special educa-
tion.73 Texas educators indicate that the state’s precise motive was “to
control special education costs,” not fairly fund the cost of educa-
tion.74 Now, current estimates indicate that Texas will need to spend
$3.2 billion in the next three years to close the funding gap it cre-
ated.75 As the following Section further reveals, manipulating funding
for special education and other disadvantaged students is extremely
prevalent and has particularly serious negative effects for those
students.
B. Manipulating Student Weights
Overt manipulations of base costs are far from states’ only tool.
States also manipulate the supplements they provide for disadvan-
taged students, which can generate even larger budget savings because
those buildings in fair to poor condition); COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCH., FACILITY
NEEDS AND COSTS IN AMERICA’S GREAT CITY SCHOOLS 3 (2011) (studying the school
facilities in the nation’s major cities and identifying $61.4 billion in needed repairs and
$19.0 billion in deferred maintenance).
69 See DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 756 (discussing the compounding costs of unfunded
school facility updates and repairs).
70 See id.; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 900 n.4; BUD FERILLO, CORRIDOR OF SHAME: THE
NEGLECT OF SOUTH CAROLINA’S RURAL SCHOOLS (2006), http://www.corridorofshame.
com/whataboutus/background.php (documenting school facilities that are roughly a
century old and in deep disrepair).
71 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Issues Findings in
Texas Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Monitoring (Jan. 11, 2018) [hereinafter
IDEA Monitoring], https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-
issues-findings-texas-individuals-disabilities-education-act-monitoring.
72 Id.
73 Alejandra Matos, Texas Needs to Find Up to $3.3 Billion to Bring Special Education
Services Up to National Standards, HOUS. CHRON. (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.
houstonchronicle.com/news/investigations/article/Texas-may-pay-up-to-3-billion-to-raise-
special-13146845.php.
74 Aliyya Swaby, Special Education Caps Were the Texas Legislature’s Idea, Educators
Say, TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/01/14/school-groups-
special-education-texas-legislators (quoting from a legislative report).
75 See Matos, supra note 73.
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the supplements can vary so wildly. These manipulations, moreover,
are normatively worse than base manipulations. Whereas manipu-
lating the base affects the entire state, manipulating funding for disad-
vantaged students impacts districts serving the neediest students the
most and, as a result, widens inequality even further.
States typically allocate supplemental funding for disadvantaged
students through their funding formulas. While complex in practice,
these formulas are conceptually simple in regard to disadvantaged stu-
dents. Some students, particularly low-income students, require more
resources to achieve at grade level than others.76 To address these
needs, states add a specific percentage of funding to the base funding
for each low-income student a school district enrolls.77 This is called
weighted funding.78
Unfortunately, like the base amount itself, determining the
appropriate additional percentage that low-income students require is
not an exact science.79 Researchers and educators all agree that low-
income students require substantial additional resources, but their
estimates of precisely how much vary. There is, however, a general
consensus among experts and the federal government that low-income
students require at least forty percent more resources than the
average student.80 The variance comes from those few researchers
who set the minimum threshold at thirty percent and others who sug-
gest that covering all low-income students’ needs requires something
closer to sixty percent more funding.81
States consistently ignore the general consensus and take advan-
tage of these nuanced differences in four distinct ways. First, some
states select estimates that are not even within the range of expert
76 See, e.g., WILLIAM D. DUNCOMBE & JOHN YINGER, CTR. POL’Y RES., HOW MUCH
MORE DOES A DISADVANTAGED STUDENT COST? (2004).
77 See Objective Formula for Base Student Cost Is Essential, TPCREF.ORG (2016), http://
www.tpcref.org/objective-formula-for-base-student-cost-is-essential.
78 See generally MIKE PETKO, WEIGHTED STUDENT FORMULA (“WSF”): WHAT IS IT
AND HOW DOES IT IMPACT EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS IN LARGE URBAN DISTRICTS? 6
(2005), http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/HE/formula.pdf (explaining the meaning and basics
of weighted funding).
79 Objective Formula for Base Student Cost Is Essential, supra note 77.
80 See Education Finance Incentive Grant Program, 20 U.S.C. § 6337 (2006) (setting
the standard for whether low-income schools are fairly funded as whether they receive a
forty percent funding increase adjustment); THOMAS B. PARRISH ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., INEQUALITIES IN PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT
REVENUES 62 (1998) (identifying forty percent as the appropriate adjustment for low-
income students).
81 Ross Wiener & Eli Pristoop, How States Shortchange the Districts That Need the
Most Help, in EDUCATION TRUST, FUNDING GAPS 5, 5 (2006).
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judgment.82 As the following chart reveals,83 six states provided no
additional funding for low-income students at all in 2015, and the vast
majority of states did not provide even half of what the federal gov-
ernment and experts estimate is necessary.84 A mere three states
applied a supplemental weight that would have met those federal and
expert assessments.
ADDITIONAL FUNDING WEIGHT PER LOW-INCOME PUPIL
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Second, states exploit the variance among experts and select low
estimates seemingly for no reason other than to achieve cost savings.
New York offers a perfect example. After New York’s highest court
confirmed that the state was inequitably and inadequately funding its
schools, the trial court appointed a blue ribbon panel to study the
82 See, e.g., IVY MORGAN & ARY AMERIKANER, EDUC. TRUST, FUNDING GAPS: AN
ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL FUNDING EQUITY ACROSS THE U.S. AND WITHIN EACH STATE 6
(2018), https://1k9gl1yevnfp2lpq1dhrqe17-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/
2014/09/FundingGapReport_2018_FINAL.pdf (2018) [hereinafter FUNDING GAPS 2018]
(states with the largest funding gaps between the highest and lowest poverty school
districts are Alabama, New York, Maryland, and Illinois); LEGIS. FIN. COMM., PROGRESS
REPORT: MODERNIZING THE PUBLIC EDUCATION FUNDING FORMULA 3 (2017), https://
www.nmlegis.gov/Entity/LFC/Documents/Program_Evaluation_Progress_Reports/
Funding%20Formula%20Progress%20Report%20-%20September%202017.pdf (noting
that New Mexico’s fifteen percent multiplier for at-risk students was low); STUDENT
POVERTY FUNDING, supra note 20.
83 This chart is based on data from STUDENT POVERTY FUNDING, supra note 20. Some
states excluded from the chart do increase a district’s funding when its percentage of low-
income students reaches some precise level but do not provide funding for individual low-
income students. Due to their complexities, these concentrated poverty funds cannot be
accurately included in this chart.
84 The remaining states not included on this chart relied on funding formulas that either
defied categorization or sought to address student poverty by basing supplements on a
sliding scale that depends on the percentage of low-income students in a district. Research
supports such an approach if implemented properly, but no more than a couple of states do
it properly. See BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., EDUC. L. CTR., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A
NATIONAL REPORT CARD (7th ed. 2018) (calculating the extent to which school funding
systems appropriately factor in concentrated poverty).
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reforms necessary to bring the state’s funding system into compli-
ance.85 The panel recommended a fifty percent weight for low-income
students.86 After this recommendation and the Governor’s support for
it, the state later chose to apply a thirty-five percent weight instead.87
New York, at least, considered another study in making this decision,
but offered no rational explanation for why the lower estimate was the
appropriate one, begging the question of its motivation. The state’s
lack of commitment to fairly funding the needs of disadvantaged stu-
dents became clearer two years later. With the court no longer
policing it, New York stopped funding the increases it had just prom-
ised to provide.88
The third way that states manipulate additional funding weights
for disadvantaged students is to require local districts to cover an inor-
dinate percentage of the additional funding themselves.89 In other
words, a state might indicate that low-income students require thirty
percent more resources but leave the task of raising most of those
additional funds to local districts. Districts with inordinate numbers of
low-income students tend to lack the fiscal capacity to raise those
funds and, thus, students do not actually receive them.90 The real-
world effect of manipulating funding for low-income students is enor-
mous. By simply changing the multiplier, the state can drastically
reduce its financial obligation to disadvantaged students. New York’s
decision to apply a 35% rather than 50% student weight, for instance,
reduced its funding obligation by $1 billion.91
Finally, states compound the manipulation of poverty weighting
by failing to account for the effects of concentrated poverty. Research
uniformly indicates that as the concentration of poverty in a school
increases the negative educational effects of poverty are com-
pounded.92 Thus, it costs more per pupil to counteract the disadvan-
85 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 56 (N.Y. 2006).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Rebell, supra note 24.
89 In an attempt to obfuscate what it was doing, Kansas manipulated student poverty
weights extensively. To arrive at the base education cost, it applied a poverty weighting
filter to all the actual expenditures districts were incurring. Gannon V, 402 P.3d 513, 530
(Kan. 2017). But once it had that determined the base costs, it applied a different lower
weighting when determining how much state funding it would send districts. Id. at 531.
Moreover, the state changed those poverty weightings three years in a row. Id. at 530.
90 See generally BAKER ET AL., supra note 84 (charting and grading states on the extent
to which they progressively fund student need in higher poverty districts).
91 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 56 (N.Y. 2006).
92 See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 20–23 (1966); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG,
ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL
CHOICE 39–40 (2001); Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education:
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tage of poverty in a school where half the students are low-income
than it does in a school where only a few students are low-income.93
More than two-thirds of states exclude concentrated poverty from
their formulas,94 which is doubly problematic in states where supple-
ments for individual low-income students are already too low.95
The few states that take concentrated poverty into account tend
to grossly underestimate its costs. Wisconsin, for instance, provides a
mere $66.17 in additional funding for each low-income student in
schools where over half of the students are low-income.96 Other states
provide larger supplements but focus on the wrong school districts. A
state might create funding increases when poverty concentration hits
10, 20, or 25%, but make no adjustment for increases in poverty
beyond that.97 Increasing funding for districts with these low levels of
poverty is irrational because concentrated poverty, by definition, does
not exist in these districts.98 Social science demonstrates the harms of
concentrated poverty occur when the percentage of low-income stu-
dents reaches or exceeds approximately 50–75%.99
Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1335 (2004) (arguing
that the best way to reach the goal of Brown is desegregation by economic class); see also
GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 53 (1996) (indicating that research has
consistently found a “powerful relationship between concentrated poverty and virtually
every measure of school-level academic results”).
93 See Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the
Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 411 (2012) (discussing the higher
costs in higher poverty districts and arguing that, for this reason, segregation is
economically inefficient).
94 STUDENT POVERTY FUNDING, supra note 20; MARGARET WESTON, CTR. POVERTY
RESEARCH, ADJUSTING WEIGHTED PUPIL FUNDING FOR CONCENTRATED POVERTY.
95 New York, for instance, had relied on a study that used a low estimate of the
additional resources that each low-income student needed and then excluded a
concentrated poverty rating all together. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 861 N.E.2d at
65–66.
96 STUDENT POVERTY FUNDING, supra note 20. Virginia maxes out its additional
funding for concentrated poverty at thirteen percent. Id.
97 See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 738–39 (Ohio 1997) (freezing the aid for
concentrated poverty once it reaches twenty percent).
98 Colorado, for instance, begins its poverty concentration supplements when district
poverty is simply above the statewide average (37.2% in 2016). STUDENT POVERTY
FUNDING, supra note 20.
99 See KAHLENBERG, supra note 92, at 39–40 (explaining that researchers have defined
high-poverty as the point where fifty percent or more of students are eligible for free- or
reduced-price meals because students in these schools have far lower test scores than
similar students in schools with lesser concentrations of low-income students); MICHAEL J.
PUMA ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PROSPECTS: STUDENT OUTCOMES FINAL REPORT 12
(1997), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED413411.pdf (“School poverty depresses the
scores of all students in schools where at least half of the students are eligible for
subsidized lunch, and seriously depresses the scores when over 75 percent of students live
in low-income households.”); MICHAEL J. PUMA ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PROSPECTS:
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When states fail to properly adjust their formulas for concen-
trated poverty, they are advantaging predominantly middle-income
districts. With no weighting for concentrated poverty, they limit the
extent to which funds will be redistributed away from middle-income
districts. And when they create additional funding for low levels of
poverty, they ironically send funding to districts that do not actually
need it.100 The byproduct is to deprive high poverty districts of funds
that they otherwise deserve.101
When states combine minor base cost manipulations with these
student weighting manipulations, they generate enormous funding
variations. Supplemental funding for at-risk students plays such a sig-
nificant role that states do not need to manipulate the base at all to
drive down education costs. And student poverty manipulations are
arguably worse. Whereas manipulating the base affects the entire
state, manipulations of student demographic weights targets those dis-
tricts serving the neediest students for the biggest reductions.
C. Bifurcating Funding Between the State and Local Districts
In addition to base manipulation and the manipulation of student
weights, states also gerrymander school funding through the bifurca-
tion of funding responsibility between the state and local districts.
Anytime the state covers something short of the entire overall cost of
education, the possibility of gerrymandering arises. Whether the
state’s cost estimate of an adequate education is on target or low, vari-
ations among districts will be substantial if local districts are to cover a
large portion of the cost themselves.102 Many districts will be unable
to raise the funds necessary to cover their portion, while others—typi-
cally suburbs—easily raise their share and more.103
The following chart104 demonstrates that only two states finance
the primary cost of public education themselves. The rest place sub-
stantial school funding burdens on local communities. In fact, most
THE CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED STUDY OF EDUCATIONAL GROWTH AND
OPPORTUNITY: THE INTERIM REPORT 77 tbl.1.51 (1993), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/
ED361466.pdf (demonstrating a precipitous decline in student performance once the
percentage of low-income students reaches fifty percent).
100 See, e.g., Derek W. Black, The Congressional Failure to Enforce Equal Protection
Through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313 (2010).
101 Id.
102 Black, supra note 32, at 1363; Brown, supra note 19.
103 Black, supra note 32, at 1354–55.
104 For underlying data, see NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
REVENUES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS, BY SOURCE OF FUNDS
AND STATE OR JURISDICTION, 2013–2014.
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states require local communities to finance more than half of the cost
of public education.
STATE PUBLIC SCHOOL EXPENDITURES AS A
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and
other cases, courts have characterized the decision to place substantial
funding burdens on local districts as a value choice to support local
autonomy.105 The past four decades have shown this characterization
to be a farce. The only districts afforded autonomy under a bifurcated
system of education funding are the wealthy ones.106 They can choose
to fully fund their education systems or not. Their choice is typically to
fund it. Other districts lack the fiscal capacity to make that choice.
Thus, their choice, if it can be called that, is the extent to which they
will underfund education.
Bifurcation, however, is not just a burden for needy districts. It is
an affirmative benefit for wealthier suburban districts because it
spares them from any meaningful participation in a statewide funding
system. First, bifurcation means that the state will only redistribute a
portion of the available combined state and local education
resources.107 In other words, the state will not spread the full cost of
public education for all districts across all districts. It will only spread
a portion of that cost. The state could, for instance, set statewide prop-
erty and income tax rates at the level necessary to generate the full
cost of public education for the state. But when the state bifurcates
105 411 U.S. 1, 53 (1973); Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 373–74 (Colo. 2009); Comm. for
Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1186–89 (Ill. 1996).
106 See id. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disapproving of state educational financing
schemes that are contingent on taxable local wealth).
107 See generally JOAN YOUNGMAN, SCHOOL FINANCE AND PROPERTY TAXES (2016),
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/School_Finance_and_Property_
Taxes_w16LL-v2.pdf (excerpted from A GOOD TAX: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE
PROPERTY TAX IN THE UNITED STATES (2016)).
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funding, it sets statewide tax rates at a level that covers something less
than the full cost.108 The rest is left to the districts.109 Second, bifurca-
tion means that wealthy districts can spend disproportionate amounts
on public education.110 The state makes limited demands that they
contribute to the statewide system and leaves them free to spend as
much they want on their own local system.111 The lower the state con-
tribution to districts in general, the less the state demands that
wealthy districts contribute to the state system.112 And the less the
state demands from wealthy districts, the more those districts can
spend on their local schools.113
The following chart114 demonstrates that states that provide the
most aid to school districts tend to have smaller funding gaps between
high- and low-need school districts. And states that provide less aid to
school districts tend to have the largest funding gaps. In other words,
the percentage of funding that the state provides for education
roughly corresponds with the funding gaps between districts. These
funding gaps, of course, dictate the extent to which districts serving
predominantly low-income students can meet their students’ academic
needs.
108 See generally id. at 17–20 (discussing the relationship between state and local
taxation for education).
109 Id.; DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 738 (Ohio 1997) (“The effect of an increase in
this percentage would be to decrease the amount of basic state aid, resulting in an even
greater burden for local schools to fund education through local property and/or income
taxes.”).
110 See, e.g., Spending per Student, CONN. SCH. FIN. PROJECT, http://ctschoolfinance.org/
spending/per-student (last visited June 6, 2019) (showing a spending variation of up to
$23,327 per student between districts in Connecticut).
111 See, e.g., id.; Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 934 (Kan. 2005).
112 For instance, prior to adopting a statewide income tax in 2008, New Jersey funded
very little of the cost of education. After adopting a statewide income tax, the state became
able to redistribute resources and now, low-income districts receive more state funding
because wealthier districts are better able to cover the costs of adequately funding their
schools. See Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 1031 (N.J. 2009).
113 See, e.g., ADVANCE ILL., SCHOOL FUNDING IN ILLINOIS (2016), http://www.
advanceillinois.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/An-Overview.pdf (reporting that prior to
2017, local property taxes constituted sixty-two percent of Illinois districts’ school funding,
compared to thirty-eight percent funding provided by the state, leaving high poverty
districts with much less funding for schools).
114 The chart is based on data from NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION
OF EDUCATION 2019, at 138 (reporting sources of revenue for 2015–2016), https://
nces.ed.gov/pubs2019/2019144.pdf and FUNDING GAPS 2018, supra note 82 (relying on 2015
school funding data, which came from the National Center for Education Statistics).
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SCHOOL FUNDING GAPS IN RELATION TO STATE AID
In a system in which the state was the sole source of education
funding, the foregoing problems would not occur. The decision to
bifurcate funding is one that frees wealthy districts from having their
education spending anchored to the state system in any meaningful
way. In this respect, the state’s decision regarding the percentage of
education costs it will cover is ultimately a decision about how much it
will spare the suburbs or meet the needs of districts serving high per-
centages of at-risk students.115 If the state does anything other than
pick up the vast majority of those costs, the state is deciding to allow
advantaged districts to operate as they see fit and leaving others short
of meeting student needs. The less the state picks up, the more it exac-
erbates the problem.116
Although the effects are smaller, states also advantage wealthy
districts when they send districts basic operating funds through flat or
matching grants. The most problematic examples occur with special
education and English language learner (ELL) programs. Rather than
calculating districts’ actual needs and geographic costs, some states
give every eligible district the exact same amount to educate their
ELL students.117 The problem is that the cost of educating ELL stu-
dents is far higher than the state’s per-pupil flat grant.118 Wealthy dis-
tricts can make up the difference, but lower-income districts often
cannot.119 Even worse is the practice of awarding lump sum grants.
115 See, e.g., FUNDING GAPS 2018, supra note 82, at 8.
116 See, e.g., BAKER ET AL., supra note 84, at 2.
117 See, e.g., Bruce D. Baker & Paul L. Markham, State School Funding Policies and
Limited English Proficient Students, 26 BILINGUAL RES. J. 659, 665 (2002). Not every
district will necessarily receive ELL funding because the state may require districts to
enroll a minimum number of ELL students to receive a grant, but all eligible districts will
receive the same grant. Id.
118 Id. at 679.
119 DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 758–59 (Ohio 1997).
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Districts have to enroll a minimum number of students to be eligible
for a grant, but all eligible districts receive the same flat grant regard-
less of the number of students in the program. Ohio operated a special
education program with this general approach, failing to cover special
education costs on a per pupil basis.120 The practical effect of such a
program is to advantage wealthy districts and leave students in other
districts without the resources they need.
D. Working Backward Toward a Result
While the various foregoing gerrymandering tools are prospective
in that they manipulate portions of their funding formulas to decrease
costs, in a few instances, states brazenly work backward to achieve a
predetermined funding amount. These states begin the budgeting pro-
cess by determining how much they are willing to spend on educa-
tion—an arbitrary number—and with that dollar amount in hand, the
state develops a funding formula that will produce that precise
amount. The state does not base the funding formula on any real or
objective estimates; it simply fills in the blanks in the formula with
numbers that, when multiplied, will equal the preordained amount of
money the state is willing to spend. In other words, the state’s educa-
tion expenditures are divorced from any realistic assessment of stu-
dent need or education costs. The state has simply decided to “work
backward” to a result—the epitome of gerrymandering.
At least two different states—Ohio and Kansas—have been
caught by their state supreme courts doing exactly that. After
explaining the multiple flaws in Ohio’s funding formula, the Ohio
Supreme Court adopted an expert witness’s holistic assessment of
Ohio’s funding formula:
The ‘formula amount’ has no real relation to what it actually costs
to educate a pupil. . . . [T]he foundation dollar amount ‘is a budg-
etary residual, which is determined as a result of working backwards
through the state aid formula after the legislature determines the
total dollars to be allocated to primary and secondary education in
each biennial budget. Thus, the foundation level reflects political
and budgetary considerations at least as much as it reflects a judg-
ment as to how much money should be spent on K–12
education.’121
The Kansas Supreme Court similarly concluded that the state was
working backward. On its face, the state’s contribution to education
funding was based on estimates of local districts’ revenues and how
120 See id. at 738–39.
121 Id. at 738.
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much they would still need from the state.122 Kansas, however,
appeared to inflate its estimates of local district revenues to generate
figures that would leave it only owing local districts the amount the
state was willing to give them.123 In other words, if the actual cost of
education in Kansas is $9000 per pupil next year, but the state only
wants to pay $6000 of it, the state estimates that a local district will
generate $3000 per pupil even though it knows this local estimate is
inaccurate. The state is simply working backward.
In addition to working backward to hit precise dollar amounts,
states have also worked backward to benefit particular districts.
Pennsylvania is the most obvious example. In 2013, the legislature,
claiming to address underfunding in the state, developed a one-time
supplemental funding package and targeted it to particular districts.124
The state constitution, however, prohibits special, as opposed to state-
wide, appropriations, so the legislature developed one of the most
nuanced funding systems one could imagine.125 Rather than one state-
wide formula, Pennsylvania developed twelve separate formulas and
included factors so complicated and precise that only a couple of dis-
tricts would qualify under each formula.126 With names like “rural
school supplement,” the formula’s explicit goal was to assist rural
schools or small schools with special needs, but six of the twelve for-
mulas funded a single district each.127 Altogether, these twelve for-
mulas sent funds to just twenty-one of the state’s five hundred school
districts.128 The most telling evidence that the state had worked back-
ward from political goals is that “33 of the 37 lawmakers who
represent the 21 districts that received extra funds are legislative
leaders, committee chairs, vice chairs or secretaries.”129 This evidence
made it clear that the state had no interest in pursuing its stated goals.
Rather, the real goal was to reward the political leadership’s home
districts and no one else. It devised a formula that did exactly that.
This Pennsylvania example painfully captures the gerryman-
dering that occurs on a broader scale in states across the country.
122 Gannon V, 402 P.3d 513 (Kan. 2017).
123 Id. at 532.
124 See Jeff Hawkes, Legislators Give $30.3M to 21 School Districts Behind Closed
Doors, LANCASTER ONLINE (July 21, 2013), https://lancasteronline.com/news/legislators-
give-m-to-school-districts-behind-closed-doors/article_46b7acd1-05ae-5411-a1cc-
3f6427782c8b.html.
125 PA. CONST. art. III, § 32 (“The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in
any case which has been or can be provided for by general law.”).
126 PUB. CITIZENS FOR CHILDREN & YOUTH, THE BOTTOM LINE IS CHILDREN: PUBLIC
EDUCATION IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY 6 (2013); Hawkes, supra note 124.
127 Hawkes, supra note 124.
128 Id.
129 Id.
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States have multiple levers through which to manipulate school
funding and often exercise them with impunity. Sometimes the result
is to decrease school funding generally. Sometimes the result is to dis-
advantage districts serving high need students while setting wealthier
districts free from the limitations of a statewide system. Sometimes
the state seemingly could care less and builds funding formulas that
are entirely arbitrary, save for the state’s desire to achieve some ulte-
rior objective—a precise dollar expenditure or benefits for precise dis-
tricts. All of these practices are divorced from what states are
constitutionally charged with doing—coming up with rational for-
mulas that provide adequate and equal educational opportunities.
E. Inaction and Resistance
States have one final tool in their arsenal, although it does not
technically fit the category of gerrymandering: willful non-action and
resistance. The most basic form of non-action occurs when states
refuse to adopt and fully fund an education financing formula. These
states do not go through the pretense of accounting for districts’
varying demographic and geographic needs in a funding formula.
Instead, they refuse to do anything. For instance, between 1991 and
2008, Pennsylvania did not use any type of formula to fund its
schools.130 The state’s education budget was based on nothing more
than the raw dollars it had spent in the previous year.131 Changes in
enrollment, district wealth, and student demographics did not have
any effect on how much money the state actually gave a district.132
The state knew the system was arbitrary and only served to cap educa-
tion costs—a point laid bare when the state finally adopted a funding
formula in 2008 only to abandon it three years later in order to save
money.133
Other states adopt funding formulas but refuse to appropriate
money to fund them. Mississippi, for instance, has a statutorily
enacted funding formula but refuses to allocate the funds that the
formula indicates schools need.134 Mississippi has only fully funded its
130 See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., A SCHOOL FUNDING FORMULA FOR PHILADELPHIA:
LESSONS FROM URBAN DISTRICTS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 2 (2015), http://www.
pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/01/philadelphiaschoolfundingreportjanuary2015.pdf.
131 Id. (describing Pennsylvania’s “hold-harmless” funding system which was designed
to ensure only that funding was not cut from one year to the next).
132 Id.
133 EDUC. L. CTR., supra note 41, at 4.
134 MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-151-7 (2019) (providing a formula for the annual allocation of
funding for each school district in Mississippi).
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formula four times in twenty years.135 In some years, the governor
even imposes mid-year cuts to the already underfunded education
budget.136 Virginia’s practice is similar but constitutionally more egre-
gious. The state constitution directs the state board of education to set
the “[s]tandards of quality”137 and the General Assembly to appro-
priate funds to “meet[] the prescribed standards of quality.”138 In
recent years, the Virginia General Assembly has completely flouted
this constitutional structure. In 2016, for instance, the state appropri-
ated $339 million less than the resources projected as necessary to
deliver the state standards of quality.139
The more common practice in recent years, however, is for states
to actively resist changing their funding formula in response to a judi-
cial finding that the current formula is constitutionally deficient. Or
when the state finally implements change, it acts simply to temporarily
escape the current crisis knowing that it can resort to its prior prac-
tices as soon as the judiciary ends the case. The worst examples of
resistance in recent history are in Kansas and Washington.
The Kansas Supreme Court issued seven different opinions
between 2003 and 2018, finding that the state’s school funding formula
was unconstitutional.140 At one point, rather than address the
problem, state legislators threatened the judiciary itself, taking steps
135 Bracey Harris, School Funding Rewrite Clears Appropriations, Advances to Full
House, CLARION LEDGER (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/
politics/2018/01/16/school-funding-rewrite-clears-appropriations-advances-full-house/
1035523001; see also Facts About Education in Mississippi, PARENTS CAMPAIGN
RESEARCH & EDUC. FUND (May 29, 2015), http://www.tpcref.org/facts-about-education-in-
mississippi (reporting that the last time Mississippi schools were fully funded according to
the formula was in 2008, and that in the years since, schools have been underfunded by
$1.7 billion).
136 See PARENTS CAMPAIGN RESEARCH & EDUC. FUND, supra note 135 (reporting mid-
year cuts in 2009 and 2010); see also Keith M. Phaneuf, House Tells Governor to Save
Money Without Cutting School Aid, CONN. MIRROR (May 2, 2018), https://ctmirror.org/
2018/05/02/house-tells-governor-save-money-without-cutting-school-aid (discussing the
Governor’s mid-year cut to the Education Cost Sharing program and a legislative response
to prevent such action in the future).
137 VA. CONST. art. 8, § 2.
138 Id. While the state has discretion in how it raises those funds and, if necessary, the
state can revise the standards of quality, it has a constitutional duty to otherwise fund the
cost of the education standards adopted by the Board. Scott v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. Cir.
324, at *4 (1992).
139 CYNTHIA A. CAVE, VA. BD. OF EDUC., VIRGINIA BOARD OF EDUCATION AGENDA
ITEM F (2016), http://www.doe.virginia.gov/boe/meetings/2016/10-oct/agenda-items/item-
f.pdf; VA. 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66; Chris Duncombe, State Budget Misses on
Long-Term Solutions for K-12, COMMONWEALTH INST. FOR FISCAL ANALYSIS: THE HALF
SHEET (Mar. 2, 2017), http://thehalfsheet.org/post/157910531208/state-budget-misses-on-
long-term-solutions-for.
140 See, e.g., Gannon VI, 420 P.3d 477 (Kan. 2018); Gannon V, 402 P.3d 513 (Kan. 2017);
Gannon IV, 390 P.3d 461 (Kan. 2017); Gannon v. State (Gannon III), 372 P.3d 1181 (2016);
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to change how judges are appointed,141 to reduce the judiciary’s
funding and, if necessary, pass a constitutional amendment to deprive
the court of jurisdiction in school funding cases.142 Washington’s legis-
lature did not threaten the judiciary but similarly refused to respond
to court orders for years, eventually forcing the court to impose a
$100,000-a-day fine until the state acted.143 Even then, the state did
not spring into action.144
From afar, Kansas and Washington appear as nothing more than
textbook examples of the general difficulty involved in securing legis-
lative compliance. But up close, they represent another way in which
states arbitrarily and illegitimately underfund education. Once they
lose before the state supreme court, states are past the point of being
able to easily gerrymander school funding in new ways—at least
without getting caught—so they cling to the status quo instead. Con-
sider the circumstances: Courts are demanding that the state eliminate
its inadequate or unequal funding system and the state actively
resists.145 Legislative foot-dragging, recalcitrance, and hostility toward
the judiciary are not ends in themselves but the means by which to
maintain the status quo for as long as possible. And the state is doing
so by exercising raw power. The state’s refusal to comply with judicial
orders is borne not out of some legitimate position but its recognition
Gannon v. State (Gannon II), 368 P.3d 1024 (Kan. 2016); Gannon v. State (Gannon I), 319
P.3d 1196 (Kan. 2014).
141 Editorial Board, The Partisan Winds Aimed at Kansas’ Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/opinion/the-partisan-winds-aimed-at-kansas-
court.html; Rhonda Holman, Editorial, Lawmakers Showing Contempt for Courts,
WICHITA EAGLE (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.kansas.com/opinion/editorials/
article16415747.html.
142 Hunter Woodall, Constitutional Amendment on Education Funding Heads to the
House Floor, KAN. CITY STAR (Apr. 4, 2018, 8:09 PM), https://www.kansascity.com/news/
politics-government/article207953054.html.
143 Order, McCleary v. State, 296 P.3d 227 (Wash. 2012) (No. 84362-7), http://
www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/843627_
081315McClearyorder.pdf.
144 Melissa Santos & Jordan Schrader, Court Fines State Government $100,000 per Day
for Failure to Fund Education, NEWS TRIBUNE (Aug. 13, 2015, 9:32 AM), https://www.
thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/article31008225.html (quoting a state
legislator remarking that the fines were not so large as to require an immediate legislative
response); Joseph O’Sullivan, Washington Supreme Court Ends Long-Running McCleary
Education Case Against the State, SEATTLE TIMES (June 9, 2018, 10:51 AM), https://www.
seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-supreme-court-ends-100000-per-day-sanctions-
against-state-in-mccleary-education-case (noting that the daily fines for failure to comply
had been in place for over two years).
145 See, e.g., Joy Chia & Sarah A. Seo, Battle of the Branches: The Separation of Powers
Doctrine in State Education Funding Suits, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 125, 145 (2007).
41816-nyu_94-6 Sheet No. 18 Side A      12/10/2019   14:44:50
41816-nyu_94-6 Sheet No. 18 Side A      12/10/2019   14:44:50
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-6\NYU601.txt unknown Seq: 31  6-DEC-19 15:20
December 2019] EDUCATIONAL GERRYMANDERING 1415
that the courts’ ability to force the state’s hand or penalize it is
extremely limited.146
The most obvious examples of passing a remedy only to revert to
prior practice once the judiciary accepted the remedy are in New York
and New Jersey. New York went through a long process of adopting a
new funding formula in the early 2000s.147 Its final formula was flawed
in the various respects discussed above, but it included just enough
new funding for the court to agree that the state was taking reason-
able steps toward compliance.148 At that point, the court ended the
case.149 In retrospect, all the state had done was promise to ade-
quately fund its schools; it had not actually done so yet.150 Within a
few years of the promise, the state cut $1.4 billion from the education
budget.151 New Jersey, similarly, had been forced to adopt a new
school funding formula in 2008 and sought the Court’s blessing.152 But
within two years, the state began grossly underfunding the formula,
cutting $1.6 billion from the amount the statutory formula required.153
In short, identifying and enacting a school funding formula free of ger-
rymandering is only half the battle. States still reserve and exercise the
power to underfund the formula or revert back to prior practices in
any given year.
II
WHY STATES GERRYMANDER SCHOOL FUNDING
States have previously claimed that their funding formulas are
aimed at fostering local control, adapting funding to local circum-
stances, and meeting student needs.154 Part I makes clear that these
formulas are not actually achieving those goals. This Article argues
146 See generally Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1025 (2004) (explaining that the
litigation, rather than securing specific remedies, garners plaintiffs a seat at the bargaining
table that the normal political processes otherwise deny them).
147 See Natalie Gomez-Velez, Urban Public Education Reform: Governments,
Accountability, Outsourcing, 45 URB. LAW. 51, 78 n.133 (2013).
148 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 61 (N.Y. 2006).
149 Id.
150 Aristy-Farer v. State, 81 N.E.3d 360, 368 (N.Y. 2017) (describing the history of the
Campaign for Fiscal Equity case); see also Neil Demause & Elizabeth Green, The
Campaign for Fiscal Equity Lawsuit Was the Best Hope for City Schools. It Failed.,
VILLAGE VOICE (Jan. 21, 2009), https://www.villagevoice.com/2009/01/21/the-campaign-
for-fiscal-equity-lawsuit-was-the-best-hope-for-city-schools-it-failed (“This is not the post-
victory landscape the people who waged the lawsuit imagined.”).
151 See Maisto v. State, 64 N.Y.S.3d 139, 144 (App. Div. 2017) (noting that the
2010–2011 New York State budget reduced formula-based school aid by $1.4 billion).
152 Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 992 (N.J. 2009).
153 Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1025–26 (N.J. 2011).
154 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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that the reason these formulas do not achieve the stated goals is
because states actually harbor a different set of goals. As to bifurcated
funding schemes, for instance, state motives are, at worst, to create a
system that preferences middle-income districts and, at best, to avoid
spending money on public education in general. Similarly, states’
motives in intentionally keeping the multiplier for low-income stu-
dents low or non-existent is not to provide an appropriate level of
funding or to ensure efficiency in educational expenditures. It is to
arbitrarily reduce the amount the state spends on these students. In
some instances, direct evidence reveals these motives; in other
instances, states’ actions bely their motives and ulterior goals.
Motivations for school funding gerrymandering vary from state to
state and across time, but the following sections identify at least four
distinct motives: refusing to serve disadvantaged students, saving the
suburbs, rejecting the duty to fund education, and contesting the judi-
ciary’s authority to interpret and apply the constitution. Properly
understood, the first two of these motives represent efforts to target
and disadvantage certain populations. The last two represent a rejec-
tion of the state’s constitutional duty in education—a motive that
cannot be legitimate given the goals the state is tasked with pursuing
and the responsibilities they entail.
A. Not Wasting Money on Disadvantaged Students
One of the most problematic motivations for education gerry-
mandering appears to be disregard for and bias against disadvantaged
students. States know that some students cost more to educate—stu-
dents with disabilities, low-income students, ELLs, homeless students,
and others.155 Most states even acknowledge the reality of these addi-
tional costs in some way in their funding formulas.156 Yet, all but a few
states refuse to carry the full actual cost of educating these students.157
155 NATASHA USHOMIRSKY & DAVID WILLIAMS, EDUC. TRUST, FUNDING GAPS 2015,
at 5 (2015), https://edtrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/FundingGaps2015_
TheEducationTrust1.pdf (presenting a conservative estimate that it costs a district forty
percent more to educate a student in poverty than a student not in poverty); Background
of Special Education and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), NAT’L
EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/19029.htm (last visited June 7, 2019) (finding that,
on average, schools spend $7552 per student, while the average cost per special education
student is an additional $9369 per student, or $16,921).
156 See generally MORGAN & AMERIKANER, supra note 82 (examining funding for low
income students on a state-by-state basis); Maria Millard & Stephanie Aragon, State
Funding for Students with Disabilities, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES (June 2015), http://
ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbfundallf?rep=SBFAF (comparing the various ways that states
account for students with disabilities in their funding formulas).
157 See, e.g., Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont.
1989); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 65 (N.Y. 2006).
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Through their words and their actions, these states make it clear that
they are only willing to fund disadvantaged students’ education up to
a certain level.158
Texas, for instance, explicitly capped the number of special edu-
cation students it would serve and incentivized districts to do the
same.159 In doing so, it created a $3.2 billion funding gap for special
education students within just a few years.160 Other states have
recently targeted low-income students and districts for funding cuts.
New Jersey cut $1.6 billion from its education budget in 2011.161 “The
districts with high concentrations of at-risk children . . . lost $687 mil-
lion or $1530 per pupil,” whereas wealthy districts only lost $944 per
pupil.162 Michael Rebell recounts similar targeted cuts in other states:
[I]n Georgia, $112 million, amounting to over twenty percent, was
cut from the equalization component of the state’s education aid
formula established to help close the gap between wealthier and
poorer districts. . . . Illinois eliminated state funding for advanced
placement (“AP”) courses in school districts with large concentra-
tions of low-income students [and] Texas terminated pre-school ser-
vices for over 100,000 mostly at-risk students.163
Kansas was similarly draconian, enacting tax cuts for wealthy
individuals and then in following legislative sessions “stopping all
equalization payments” for poor school districts and prohibiting new
outlays for those districts in future years.164
To be clear, it is not that states lack the capacity to fully fund
disadvantaged students’ education.165 States simply refuse to.
Vermont and New Hampshire are perfect examples. Both states have
relatively few low-income students and, given the states’ overall
wealth, could easily fund education in high-need areas.166 Instead,
158 Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at 690; Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
Inc., 861 N.E.2d at 65.
159 IDEA Monitoring, supra note 71.
160 Matos, supra note 73.
161 Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1034 (N.J. 2011).
162 Id.
163 Rebell, supra note 24, at 1858.
164 Gannon I, 319 P.3d 1196, 1241–43 (2014); see also Michael Leachman, Timeline: 5
Years of Kansas’ Tax-Cut Disaster, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (May 24, 2017,
9:30 AM), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/timeline-5-years-of-kansas-tax-cut-disaster
(explaining the dire impacts that Kansas’s 2012 income tax cuts have had on the state).
165 See BAKER ET AL., supra note 84, at 15–17 (giving seventeen states an F grade for
“fiscal effort” for funding public schools based on one metric and thirteen based on
another metric).
166 See BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR?: A NATIONAL REPORT
CARD 26–27 tbl.4 (3d ed. 2014) (reporting that in 2011 New Hampshire’s per capita real
gross domestic product was higher than that of twenty-nine other states); S. EDUC.
FOUND., A NEW MAJORITY: LOW INCOME STUDENTS NOW A MAJORITY IN THE NATION’S
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these states operate funding systems that work to the distinct disad-
vantage of low-income students. In 2007, per-pupil funding in
predominantly low-income New Hampshire school districts was
twenty-three percent less than in wealthier districts.167 Vermont simi-
larly had a twenty percent funding gap for low-income districts over
several years.168
Recent events in North Carolina add a racial dimension to these
poverty challenges. North Carolina is experiencing two demographic
trends. First, low-income students, for the first time in recent history,
became the majority in its traditional public schools in 2013.169
Second, its charter schools are becoming whiter while its traditional
public schools are increasingly enrolling higher percentages of stu-
dents of color.170 These demographic trends coincided with drastic
changes in school funding. Between 2007 and 2012, the legislature cut
education funding by roughly $700 per pupil, almost a ten percent
cut.171 As a function of its gross state product, in 2015 North Carolina
exerted the third least school funding effort in the nation.172 From
2013 to 2015, North Carolina doubled its charter school funding and
instituted enormous tax cuts for the wealthiest individuals in the
state.173 These dramatic funding changes are difficult to interpret as
anything other than an intentional disinvestment in the education of
low-income and minority students.174
A statistical analysis of Pennsylvania’s school funding system
revealed similarly troubling trends. The study found “systematic racial
PUBLIC SCHOOLS app. 1 at 5 (2015) (reporting that, in 2013, Vermont and New Hampshire
had thirty-six and twenty-seven percent low-income students in their public schools,
respectively, ranking forty-eighth and fiftieth among all states for this metric).
167 BAKER ET AL., supra note 166, at 15 tbl.3.
168 BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT CARD
39–40 tbl.C-2 (4th ed. 2015) (reporting percentages of 79% in 2010, 78% in 2011, and 82%
in 2012).
169 S. EDUC. FOUND., supra note 166, at 2, 3 (reporting that in 2013 low-income students
made up fifty-three percent of North Carolina’s public-school population).
170 See Helen F. Ladd et al., The Growing Segmentation of the Charter School Sector in
North Carolina, 12 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 536, 540–41 (2017) (noting that, between 1998 and
2012, the percentage of students who were white in North Carolina charter schools
increased while the percentage decreased in the traditional public schools).
171 BAKER ET AL., supra note 168, at 8 & fig.3.
172 BAKER ET AL., supra note 84, at 16.
173 Black, supra note 35, at 432–33, 435.
174 This disinvestment also happened to coincide with the state’s targeted attempts to
undermine the voting strength of minority voters. See Covington v. North Carolina, 316
F.R.D. 117, 124 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (finding that the state defendants had failed to justify
their predominant consideration of race in drawing twenty-eight state legislative and
federal congressional districts and ordering that new maps be drawn), aff’d mem., 137 S.
Ct. 2211 (2017).
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discrimination in the distribution of state funds.”175 The state’s whitest
districts receive nearly two thousand dollars more per pupil than the
state’s fairness formula indicates they need while predominantly
minority districts receive nearly two thousand dollars less per pupil
than they need—and socio-economic differences in the districts do not
explain these gaps.176 To address this and other problems, a bipartisan
commission recently proposed a new funding formula, which is
“widely viewed as fair and comprehensive.”177 The irony is that while
the state adopted the formula, it only applied it to future increases in
funding, thereby locking in the systemic bias that exists in the
system.178 Even substantial increases in statewide school funding will
not be enough to reverse the bias.179
Were these actions not enough to explain why state leaders gerry-
mander school funding, some state leaders come out and make their
feelings explicitly known. The new majority leader in Tennessee’s
House of Representatives recently said, “no matter how well we fund
the schools there are going to be some school systems that choose to
waste the funds they could be using to educate children and provide
for good teachers and good classrooms.”180 During the campaign,
Florida’s governor similarly called for reductions in “bureaucratic
175 DAVID MOSENKIS, POWER, SYSTEMIC RACIAL BIAS IN LATEST PENNSYLVANIA
SCHOOL FUNDING 9 (2016), https://powerinterfaith.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/PA-
Racial-School-Funding-Bias-July-2016-1-1.pdf.
176 See id. at 7, 9.
177 Id. at 1.
178 Id. at 9.
179 See id. (“Even if the overall [Basic Education Funding] budget increases in future
years, current law prescribes that the whitest districts continue to receive thousands of
dollars per student more than their fair share, while the least white districts receive
thousands per student less than their fair share.”). One might add to these examples above
the line that the court-ordered equalization and increase in school funding for Kansas City
Schools (Missouri) in the context of school desegregation has long been chided as a waste
of money or failed project. See, e.g., Paul Ciotti, America’s Most Costly Educational
Failure, CATO INST., https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/americas-most-costly-
educational-failure (last visited June 21, 2019). The state of Missouri heavily contested the
federal courts’ authority to impose a school funding remedy, arguing “that federal courts
cannot set aside state-imposed limitations on local taxing authority because to do so is to
do more than to require the local government ‘to exercise the power that is theirs.’”
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 56 (1990); see also Dan Eggen & David A. Vise, Ashcroft’s
Accuracy on Desegregation Challenged , WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2001), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/01/18/ashcrofts-accuracy-on-desegregation-
challenged/b8b57c88-ef7d-4bff-bdef-e91caaa453b8 (discussing John Aschroft and the state
of Missouri’s “denial and obfuscation and obstruction at every stage” of financing the cost
of desegregating St. Louis’s schools (quoting desegregation expert Gary A. Orfield)).
180 Sam Stockard, Republican Lawmaker Calls Schools Funding Lawsuit ‘Waste’ of
Money, DAILY MEMPHIAN (Jan. 7, 2019, 2:46 PM), https://www.dailymemphian.com/
article/2252/Republican-lawmaker-calls-schools-funding-lawsuit-waste-of-money.
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waste,”181 even though the state had the ninth lowest funding levels in
the nation and its low-income districts received fewer funds than other
districts.182 One of the most egregious positions was that of New
Jersey during the earlier years of school funding litigation. Attempting
to justify school resource inequalities in the state, New Jersey argued
“that the education currently offered in these lower-income urban dis-
tricts is tailored to the students’ present need, that these students
simply cannot now benefit from the kind of vastly superior course
offerings found in the richer districts.”183 When that failed, New
Jersey, like Tennessee and Florida’s officials, sought to blame school
districts, claiming that “mismanagement[,] . . . incompetence, politics,
and worse” were the cause of education deficiencies in urban
districts.184
Now, the Secretary of Education is condoning, if not encour-
aging, these practices. Betsy DeVos claims “that spending more
money . . . is ill-placed and ill-advised.”185 While her statements do not
explicitly indicate that additional funding for poor students is a waste,
the overall context of school funding makes it hard to receive her mes-
sage as anything but that. Data shows that the in forty-four states, the
wealthiest quintile of districts have all the funding they need to
achieve average academic outcomes—often far more than they
need.186 In contrast, only nine states provide the highest poverty dis-
tricts the funds they need to achieve average outcomes.187 The gap for
these students in some states is in excess of $10,000 per pupil.188 Even
in raw numbers, roughly half of states spend less on students in the
lowest-income districts than the highest-income districts.189 Eight of
the ten states that made the largest reductions in public school funding
over the last decade also cut taxes for the wealthy or reduced their
overall tax effort.190 So when Betsy DeVos makes the general state-
181 Jeffery S. Solochek, Ron DeSantis Says Florida Public Schools Are Wasting Money.
Are They?, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.tampabay.com/news/
education/k12/Ron-DeSantis-says-Florida-public-schools-are-wasting-money-Are-they-_
172747756.
182 BAKER ET AL., supra note 84, at 10, 11.
183 Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 398 (N.J. 1990).
184 Id. at 406.
185 Lattimore, supra note 21.
186 BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., THE REAL SHAME OF THE NATION: THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTERSTATE INEQUITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOL INVESTMENTS app. C.
(2018).
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Brown, supra note 19.
190 AM. FED’N OF TEACHERS, A DECADE OF NEGLECT: PUBLIC EDUCATION FUNDING
IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GREAT RECESSION 4 (2018), https://www.aft.org/sites/default/
files/decade-of-neglect-2018.pdf.
41816-nyu_94-6 Sheet No. 21 Side A      12/10/2019   14:44:50
41816-nyu_94-6 Sheet No. 21 Side A      12/10/2019   14:44:50
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-6\NYU601.txt unknown Seq: 37  6-DEC-19 15:20
December 2019] EDUCATIONAL GERRYMANDERING 1421
ment that we should not spend more money on public schools, she is
defending the status quo: funding gaps for districts serving predomi-
nantly poor kids and the tax cuts that drive those gaps.191
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that this story is not new. Scholars
have recently begun to unearth the discriminatory motives that
shaped our modern school financing structure more than a century
ago. Camille Walsh, for instance, reveals how the system of local taxa-
tion to support public schools was established during the infancy of
formal school segregation in the late 1800s.192 Some states, for
instance, kept white taxes for white schools and black taxes for black
schools.193 Some also gave white communites the power to issue
bonds to support their schools while denying that power to blacks.194
While explicitly segregated taxes and bonds have since been declared
unconstitutional, the facially race-neutral tax and school financing pol-
icies that accompanied these explicit policies persist largely unseen
and continue to drive inequality in education today.195 Other scholars
offer more detailed accounts, revealing how Southern states changed
their constitutional systems for financing education in the late 1800s
and early 1900s as part of their effort to racially segregate schools and
disenfranchise blacks.196 Again, the courts later declared segregation
itself unconstitutional,197 but the facially race neutral tool of achieving
unequal access to school resources—finance systems that shift respon-
191 Others supporting and pushing DeVos’s agenda at the federal level are more explicit.
See, e.g., Edwin J. Feulner, Haven’t We Learned Our School Spending Lesson?, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/education/commentary/havent-we-
learned-our-school-spending-lesson (characterizing federal funding for poor students as
being “good money . . . thrown after bad”); Jude Schwalback, Federal Education Programs
Are Bloated and Failing. Now, Congress Wants to Give Them More Money, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/education/commentary/federal-
education-programs-are-bloated-and-failing-now-congress-wants-give (claiming that Head
Start, a preschool program aimed solely at disadvantaged kids, is “another prime example
of wasteful and poor policy”).
192 See CAMILLE WALSH, RACIAL TAXATION: SCHOOLS, SEGREGATION, AND TAXPAYER
CITIZENSHIP, 1869–1973, at 7–8, 15–20 (2018).
193 Id. at 50.
194 See id. at 31 (describing the City of Owensboro’s discriminatory issuance of bonds).
195 Id. at 33.
196 See, e.g. , PAUL E. HERRON, FRAMING THE SOLID SOUTH: THE STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF SECESSION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND REDEMPTION,
1860–1902, at 206 (2017); DOROTHY OVERSTREET PRATT, SOWING THE WIND: THE
MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1890, at 118 (2018); see also Clinton G.
Wallace, Tax Policy and Our Democracy, 118 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (first
reviewing CAMILLE WALSH, RACIAL TAXATION: SCHOOLS, SEGREGATION, AND
TAXPAYER CITIZENSHIP, 1869–1973 (2018); and then reviewing ANTHONY C. INFANTI,
OUR SELFISH TAX LAWS: TOWARD TAX REFORM THAT MIRRORS OUR BETTER SELVES
(2018) (focusing on the ways that tax policies and systems have promoted social injustices
and continue to do so)).
197 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
41816-nyu_94-6 Sheet No. 21 Side B      12/10/2019   14:44:50
41816-nyu_94-6 Sheet No. 21 Side B      12/10/2019   14:44:50
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-6\NYU601.txt unknown Seq: 38  6-DEC-19 15:20
1422 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1385
sibility from the state to local school districts—remains in place and
available for use today.198
B. Privileging the Suburbs
State efforts to protect entrenched privilege, while giving the
appearance of pursuing equal and adequate education for all, also
leads to gerrymandering. In the modern era, constitutional duties and
cultural expectations demand that the state provides an equal and
quality education to all students.199 But vested and politically pow-
erful interests of the status quo are allied against those ends, seeking
to favor white middle-income neighborhoods.200 Gerrymandering, in
effect, allows privileged communities to operate school systems
outside of the general rules or creates purported neutral rules that
only work to the advantage of certain communities.
James Ryan astutely concludes in his book on race, money, and
education that “the most dominant and important theme in education
law and policy for the last fifty years” has been a strategy to “save the
cities, but spare the suburbs.”201 Both in school desegregation and
school funding, Ryan explains that while the stated goal may have
often been to help “urban schools,” the precise strategy was to “help[]
in ways that do not threaten the physical, financial, or political inde-
pendence of suburban schools.”202 This strategy, he observes, “con-
tinues to shape nearly every modern education reform.”203 Kimberly
Robinson takes this insight one step further, arguing that it is overly
generous to suggest education policy actually aspires to help the
cities.204 The more accurate description, she argues, is an effort to
198 Without any appreciation of this history, the Supreme Court in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez conceptualized the divide between state and local
school financing as purely an issue of educational policy and discretion. See 411 U.S. 1,
47–52 (1973) (discussing the history of local control as an important tradition).
199 See generally Rebell, supra note 9 (discussing the impact of Brown v. Board of
Education and the role of the courts in helping provide meaningful educational
opportunities).
200 See, e.g., Laurie Reynolds, Skybox Schools: Public Education as Private Luxury, 82
WASH. U. L.Q. 755, 792 (2004) (noting that wealthy donor districts in Texas oppose the
Robin Hood redistributive school funding system).
201 JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS,
AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 5, 12–13 (2010).
202 Id. at 5.
203 Id.
204 See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Past, Present, and Future of Equal Educational
Opportunity: A Call for a New Theory of Education Federalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 427,
433 (2012) (reviewing JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY,
TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA
(2010)).
41816-nyu_94-6 Sheet No. 22 Side A      12/10/2019   14:44:50
41816-nyu_94-6 Sheet No. 22 Side A      12/10/2019   14:44:50
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-6\NYU601.txt unknown Seq: 39  6-DEC-19 15:20
December 2019] EDUCATIONAL GERRYMANDERING 1423
“save the suburbs, tinker with the cities.”205 Education reforms have
primarily attempted to “save the suburbs” for mostly white, middle-
class schoolchildren while only marginally addressing the needs of
urban schools.206
Putting their nuanced differences aside, both scholars agree that
education policy serves the interests of the suburbs rather than urban
schools. This Article’s revelation of the multiple ways in which states
gerrymandering school funding powerfully confirms their thesis.
Bifurcated state-local funding schemes, underestimates of inflation
and student need, and arbitrary school funding multipliers all serve
the interests of suburbs.207 Each of these policies minimizes the contri-
butions that suburbs must make to the statewide education system—
i.e., the needs of other students—and frees suburbs to go at education
themselves.208 Suburbs can raise as much funding as they want and
create islands of opportunity.209 In one of the earliest empirical
studies of the problem, President Nixon’s 1972 Commission on School
Finance cited the heavy reliance on local funding sources as a primary
cause of inequality210 and called on states to “assume responsibility
for determining and raising on a statewide basis, the amount of funds
required for education.”211 Yet, that inequality remains firmly
entrenched and the level of machinations that state formulas go
through to maintain it appear inexplicable on any grounds other than:
a) a desire to preference the suburbs; b) a desire to disadvantage the
cities and special needs students; or c) one of the other illicit motives
discussed below.212
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See, e.g., id. at 439–41 (citing RYAN, supra note 201) (collecting examples from
Ryan’s book where educational policies were designed to “save the suburbs”); James E.
Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432, 433–34
(1999) (arguing that the poor success rate of minority districts in school finance litigation is
at least in part attributable to the racial composition of the schools).
208 See Robinson, supra note 204, at 441 (noting efforts by suburbs to keep urban
students out of their schools).
209 The facts of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
make this point obvious. Edgewood and Alamo school districts are both in San Antonio
and a fifteen- to twenty-minute drive apart, but the Texas funding scheme allowed Alamo
to spend twice as much. Id. at 11–13; see also Cory Turner et al., Why America’s Schools
Have a Money Problem, NPR (Apr. 18, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/04/18/
474256366/why-americas-schools-have-a-money-problem (discussing the disparities in
Chicago, where local property taxes allow one district to spend nearly three times as much
on education as another nearby district).
210 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON SCH. FIN., SCHOOLS, PEOPLE, & MONEY: THE NEED FOR
EDUCATIONAL REFORM xi (1972), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED058473.pdf.
211 Id. at xii.
212 See, e.g., Phil Kadner, Illinois Schools Have Biggest Funding Gap in Nation, CHI.
TRIB. (Mar. 26, 2015, 9:17 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/ct-sta-kadner-sudies-st-
41816-nyu_94-6 Sheet No. 22 Side B      12/10/2019   14:44:50
41816-nyu_94-6 Sheet No. 22 Side B      12/10/2019   14:44:50
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-6\NYU601.txt unknown Seq: 40  6-DEC-19 15:20
1424 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1385
Preferencing suburbs is the practical inverse of targeting a group
for disfavor. Whereas disfavor entails targeting a group for exclusion
or harm, preference entails placing one group in a better position than
others. Either way, the state creates an in-group and an out-group.
With school funding, the in-group—the suburbs—just so happens to
be relatively small and the out-group can be relatively large. But in
both instances, the state engages in targeted partiality toward some
students and denies other students the impartiality that equal protec-
tion demands.213 In short, the state entrenches and favors the interests
of one group over another—the antithesis of carrying out its educa-
tional duty and the exact type of behavior driving judicial concerns in
voter redistricting.
C. Anti-Public Education Motives
The third potential motivation behind education gerrymandering
is that the state does not want to adequately fund the public education
system on the whole. In this scenario, the state may not target a partic-
ular group of students but public education in general. State leaders
simply object to the high costs that education places on the state,214
0327-20150326-column.html (discussing the confluence of property and income tax burdens
with widening school funding gaps in Illinois and concluding that “[a]ll of this is created by
legislative policies set in Springfield, and none of it happened by accident”); see also Bruce
J. Biddle & David C. Berliner, A Research Synthesis, Unequal School Funding in the
United States, 59 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 48, 51 (2002), (“Parents who moved to affluent
suburbs were generally willing to fund well-equipped, well-staffed public schools for their
own children, but . . . they saw little reason to pay additional taxes to fund equivalent
schools for the impoverished students left behind in city centers or rural towns.”); Alana
Semuels, Good School, Rich School; Bad School, Poor School, ATLANTIC (Aug. 25, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/property-taxes-and-unequal-schools/
497333 (discussing the phenomenon of “white families mov[ing] out of the cities into the
suburbs and enter[ing] school systems there, and black families [being] stuck in the cities,
where property values plummeted and schools lacked basic resources”). In some states,
where school districts were run on the county level, costs could be shared between rich and
poor districts by combining and integrating them, especially after Brown v. Board of
Education. But in states like Connecticut, with deeper histories of public schooling, there
were hundreds of separate districts, and it was much more difficult to combine them or to
equalize funding across them. Pennsylvania’s heavy reliance on property tax has created
what one researcher has called a “Wild West” of school funding, where anything goes,
including extreme funding disparities and extremely different tax burdens. Dale
Mezzacappa, Study: Pa. Is ‘Wild West’ of Property Taxes, NOTEBOOK (Mar. 2, 2017, 10:52
AM), https://thenotebook.org/articles/2017/03/02/study-pa-is-wild-west-of-property-taxes.
213 See infra Section IV.B (explaining equal protection impartiality).
214 See generally Opinion, Gov. Christie’s Toxic School Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2016,
at 10 (discussing Governor Christie’s proposed flat funding formula that would eliminate
the additional financial burden the state carries for high poverty districts—a cost he had
long been critical of); Adam Clark, Christie: Give All School Districts Same Amount of Aid,
Provide Some Towns Property Tax Relief, NJ.COM (June 21, 2016), https://nj.com/
education/2016/06/christie_nj_school_funding_announcement.html (“It is time to change
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prefer lower taxes,215 doubt the extent to which money matters to
educational quality,216 or question the validity of expert judgments as
to the precise cost of an adequate education.217 The resistance to fully
the failed school funding formula and replace it with one that will force the end of these
two crises—the property tax scandal and the disgrace of failed urban education.”); Nadia
Pflaum, Trump: U.S. Spends More than ‘Almost Any Other Major Country’ on Education,
POLITIFACT (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/ohio/statements/2016/sep/21/
donald-trump/trump-us-spends-more-almost-any-other-major-countr (President Trump
arguing that public schools are wasting money and spend more than almost any other
nation in the world); Jeffrey S. Solochek, Ron DeSantis Says Florida Public Schools Are
Wasting Money. Are They?, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.tampabay.
com/news/education/k12/Ron-DeSantis-says-Florida-public-schools-are-wasting-money-
Are-they-_172747756 (gubernatorial candidate claiming that public education wastes
money and should be more efficient).
215 See, e.g., John Eligon, Education Is Newest Target of Kansas Budget Cuts, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/12/us/politics/education-is-newest-
target-of-kansas-budget-cuts.html (discussing large education cuts and noting that critics
attributed them to earlier tax cuts); Howard Fischer, Gov. Ducey: Teachers Aren’t Going to
Get 20 Percent Pay Raises, TUCSON.COM (Mar. 29, 2018), https://tucson.com/news/local/
gov-ducey-teachers-aren-t-going-to-get-percent-pay/article_75a9b7dc-930b-5374-be12-
61fb840e4ced.html (“Gov. Doug Ducey said Thursday that teachers aren’t going to get the
20 percent pay hike they are demanding—not now and not in the foreseeable future. And
he intends to continue to propose further cuts in state taxes . . . .”); Michael Leachman,
North Carolina’s Deep Tax Cuts Impeding Adequate School Funding, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES BLOG (May 10, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/north-
carolinas-deep-tax-cuts-impeding-adequate-school-funding (noting that five of six states
with the lowest public school funding levels in 2013 also cut taxes between 2008 and 2018).
216 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 381 (N.J. 1985) (summarizing defendants’
argument that educational inequities were due to inefficient management not funding
disparities); BAKER, supra note 3, at 1 (noting the “widespread political effort” to argue
that educational quality had little or nothing to do with funding of public schools);
Lattimore, supra note 21 (recounting DeVos’s rejection of the notion that increasing
funding is good education policy); Rebell, supra note 9, at 1484–86 (surveying arguments
between states and plaintiffs over whether money matters).
217 See, e.g., Jonathan Shorman & Hunter Woodall, Lawmakers Shocked by Report that
Kansas Schools Need Up to $2 Billion, KAN. CITY STAR (Mar. 16, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://
www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article205556234.html (noting that, in
response to the Kansas Supreme Court’s ruling that educational funding was
constitutionally inadequate, lawmakers at one point tried to find experts who could show
that school funding was in fact adequate). Kansas eventually approved additional
education funding, but only after a multi-year battle with the courts and a judicial threat to
shut down schools if the state did not act. The Associated Press, Kansas Supreme Court
Signs Off on Increased Education Spending, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/06/14/us/kansas-education-funding-supreme-court.html. In New York,
the debate is so intense regarding the adequacy of current funding levels that school
advocates and the governor cannot even agree on the most basic facts. The Governor
claims that poor districts have the money they need and that the state’s underfunding of
the education formula is not a problem, while school advocates respond that both are
insufficient to address inequality. See ALLIANCE FOR QUALITY EDUCATION, JOINT
LEGISLATIVE HEARING ON THE EXECUTIVE PROPOSAL 2018–19 TESTIMONY BY THE
ALLIANCE FOR QUALITY EDUCATION (2018), http://www.aqeny.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/01/Budget-Testimony-AQE-Elem_Sec_Ed-2.pdf; Joseph Spector, Why School
Funding in New York Is Still a Major Fight, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Mar. 20, 2019, 6:00
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funding public education does not immediately present itself as an
attempt at targeted disadvantage or illegitimate goals. Efficiency and
cost savings, for instance, are generally legitimate goals, assuming they
are sincere. The legitimacy of gerrymandering in the name of effi-
ciency and savings ultimately turns on whether the state is acting
within the bounds of its constitutional duty to provide education or
instead reduces and contains education spending regardless of its
effect on educational opportunity. The latter represents an anti-
education agenda rather than simple fiscal conservatism within mar-
gins of reasonable education spending.
Anti-education agendas are illegitimate given the nature of the
state’s educational duty. State constitutions place an absolute obliga-
tion on states.218 Those constitutions, and courts’ interpretation of
them, often describe that obligation as a paramount duty of the
state.219 Thus, courts have consistently held that fiscal constraints, for
instance, cannot justify a state’s failure to carry out that duty.220 As
both federal and state courts in Kentucky explained, “neither the [leg-
islature] nor those individuals responsible for discharging the [educa-
tion] duties imposed on them by the state constitution . . . can
abrogate those duties merely because the monetary obligations
become[] unexpectedly large or onerous.”221
AM), https://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/politics/albany/2019/03/20/why-
school-funding-new-york-still-major-fight/3139023002.
218 See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 495 (Ark. 2002)
(finding that the state constitution “imposes upon the State an absolute constitutional duty
to educate our children”); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky.
1989) (finding that the state constitution’s education clause “places an absolute duty on the
General Assembly to re-create, re-establish a new system of common schools in the
Commonwealth”); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 794 A.2d 744, 754 (N.H. 2002) (“[I]t
is the State’s duty to guarantee the funding necessary to provide a constitutionally
adequate education to every educable child in the public schools in the State.”); see also
Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 75,
108 (2016) (noting the recognition of educational obligations under state constitutions
beginning in the 1970s).
219 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1; Bush v. Holmes, 919
So. 2d 392, 405 (Fla. 2006); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 85 (Wash. 1978).
220 See, e.g., Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251–52 (Cal. 1992) (applying heightened
scrutiny to education cuts notwithstanding the district’s fiscal problems); Claremont Sch.
Dist., 794 A.2d at 754 (noting that “financial reasons alone” do not excuse noncompliance
with “the constitutional command that the State must guarantee sufficient funding to
ensure . . . a constitutionally adequate education”); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 798
A.2d 602, 603–04 (N.J. 2002) (rejecting state’s request for budgetary cap on education to
ease other constraints); see also Rebell, supra note 24, at 1859–60 (noting the challenges
states face for providing adequate educational opportunities with budget shortfalls).
221 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 208 (quoting Carroll v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 410 F.
Supp. 234, 238 (W.D. Ky. 1976)).
41816-nyu_94-6 Sheet No. 24 Side A      12/10/2019   14:44:50
41816-nyu_94-6 Sheet No. 24 Side A      12/10/2019   14:44:50
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-6\NYU601.txt unknown Seq: 43  6-DEC-19 15:20
December 2019] EDUCATIONAL GERRYMANDERING 1427
Reduced to their essence, anti-education spending motivations
are legislative policy preferences. But such policy preferences necessa-
rily fail in the face of a constitutional duty to provide education.222
First, the constitutional duty unquestionably prohibits entirely
defunding education.223 Second, if fiscal constraints cannot justify the
lesser act of underfunding education,224 a policy preference to spend
less on education or lower taxes at the expense of education cannot
justify underfunding either. State discretion to pursue policy prefer-
ences only occurs in regard to spending variations beyond the amount
reasonably necessary to deliver adequate and equal education. Only
then can the state justify gerrymandering in the service of cost
containment.
Attempts to contain cost without any basis for knowing or
believing that the state has met its constitutional obligations places
cost reduction ahead of the state’s constitutional duty. In short, pur-
suing an anti-education spending agenda is antithetical to the legisla-
ture’s constitutional duty to fund education. In the context of a federal
claim, however, these motivations require more explanation, because
nothing in the Federal Constitution explicitly obligates states to pro-
vide public education.225 An anti-education objective would be a pre-
sumptively legitimate (even if an unwise) goal. The absence of any
explicit education reference in the United States Constitution has long
fueled a general consensus that states have no federal education obli-
gation. But new research emphasizing a few key historical events indi-
cates that the general consensus is wrong.
First, the history and process through which states adopted their
education clauses reveal that the provision of education was a federal
requirement.226 Prior to the Civil War, fewer than half of state consti-
tutions mandated the provision of public education.227 During the
222 See Black, supra note 35, at 460 (describing the absolutist framing that some courts
and commentators have used to describe constitutional duties to provide education).
223 See, e.g., NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 2 (“The legislature shall provide for a uniform
system of common schools, by which a school shall be established and maintained in each
school district at least six months in every year.”); S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (“The General
Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free public schools
open to all children in the State.”).
224 See Black, supra note 35, at 459–60 (“[E]ducation’s special constitutional status
requires that states put education ahead of other priorities, including during financial
crisis.”).
225 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
226 See Black, supra note 28, at 765–68.
227 Derek W. Black, The Fundamental Right to Education, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1059, 1093–94 (2019); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and
Brown v. Board of Education, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 460 (discussing the number of
states that did recognize a right to education in 1868, the year the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified).
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post-Civil War era, however, Congress saw the provision of public
education as a central pillar of state citizenship and a necessity of
rebuilding democracy.228 Using its constitutional authority and duty to
guarantee a republican form of government in each state, Congress
required Southern states to rewrite their constitutions.229 These
rewrites included providing for public education.230 In fact, Congress
explicitly conditioned the readmission of the final three Southern
states on the continued provision of equal education under their edu-
cation clauses.231 And after that historical point, no other state would
ever be admitted to the Union without an education clause.232 This
history demonstrates that the Federal Constitution, contrary to con-
ventional wisdom, does mandate that states provide education.233
Second, even without an affirmative duty, anti-education agendas
can still represent class-based disadvantage in government services.
Public education, of course, serves a discrete class of individuals, gen-
erally children under the age of twenty-one.234 Thus, when govern-
ment targets education, it necessarily targets children’s benefits. It is
disadvantaging them in relation to other government programs or
interests. More importantly, anti-education policies target the consti-
tutional rights of a single group of individuals—children.235 Under-
228 Black, supra note 28, at 778 (“Only by extending public education to the masses
could the disadvantaged of the South become full citizens and their states finally operate as
democracies.”).
229 Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429.
230 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1868 art. XI, § 6 (requiring schools in every township or
district); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1 (requiring “a system of free schools”); FLA.
CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 1 (requiring “education of all the children residing within its
borders”); GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 1 (requiring “a thorough system of general
education”); LA. CONST. of 1868, tit. VII, art. 135 (requiring “one free public school in
every parish throughout the State”); MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 1 (requiring “a
uniform system of free public schools”); N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 2 (requiring “a
general and uniform system of public schools”); S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. X, § 3 (requiring
a “uniform system of free public schools”).
231 Act of Mar. 30, 1870, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (admitting Texas on the condition that its
constitution “shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of
citizens of the United States of the school rights and privileges secured by the [state]
constitution”); Act of Feb. 23, 1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (same for Mississippi); Act of
Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (same for Virginia).
232 Black, supra note 28, at 793 & n.310; Black, supra note 227, at 1093.
233 See Black, supra note 28, at 794 (“[T]he Constitution, at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, affored special recognition to education.”)
234 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. XI, § 6 (obligating education for “all the children
of the State” in a given age range); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1 (same); LA. CONST. of
1868, tit. VII, art. 135 (same).
235 The fact that education is constitutionally grounded is also noteworthy because other
government programs, save the judicial and criminal justice systems, do not directly
implicate constitutional rights and, thus, the way in which government funds, does not
fund, or targets these other programs is of no constitutional concern.
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stood as an attack on constitutional rights, anti-education positions
are particularly anomalous. Such strange anomalies, as the Supreme
Court has repeatedly indicated, demand a persuasive legitimate expla-
nation under equal protection.236 The following Section explores the
remaining potential explanation: legislative uncertainty regarding
actual and appropriate education costs.
D. Usurping the Judiciary and Disputing Whether Money Matters
School funding gerrymandering is also an outgrowth of legislative
efforts to resist the basic empirical fact that money matters in educa-
tion and the judicial holding that the constitution obligates the state to
ensure students have adequate funding. That resistance is constitu-
tionally illegitimate. Legislative resistance occurs, in part, because the
precise cost of an adequate education is not an exact science.237
Uncertainties surrounding precise funding requirements coupled with
legislative discretion can justify substantial variance in the particular
policies that states adopt. But debate, uncertainty, and legislative dis-
cretion do not mean legislatures have carte blanche discretion. The
cost of adequacy and money’s effect on quality are ultimately empir-
ical questions with empirical answers.238 Legislatures can exercise dis-
cretion among policies that are reasonably consistent with empirical
reality,239 but they are not free to reject or entirely disregard that
reality,240 particularly when courts have already adjudicated those
facts.
At that point, the scope of constitutionally reasonable and legiti-
mate policies narrow. Legislative resistance to adequate education
funding after that point operates under the premise that the legisla-
ture has the authority to decide for itself whether it has met its consti-
tutional duty.241 This is something the legislature cannot do. First,
courts’ independent and exclusive authority to decide constitutional
236 See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 768 (2013) (“[D]iscriminations of an
unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are
obnoxious to the constitutional provision [under the Equal Protection Clause].” (quoting
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 663 (1996))).
237 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 3, at 13 (discussing scholarship disagreement about
estimating the cost of education).
238 See id. (noting various empirical findings regarding the cost of education and its
effectiveness).
239 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 52 (N.Y. 2006)
(deferring to the government’s “reasonable” estimate of the cost of education).
240 See Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 390 (Vt. 1997) (“[T]here is no reasonable doubt
that substantial funding differences significantly affect opportunities to learn.”).
241 See, e.g., Jonathan Shorman, Kansas Conservatives Renew Push for a Constitutional
Amendment on Schools After Ruling, WICHITA EAGLE (June 26, 2018, 3:03 PM), https://
www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article213856059.html (charging the Kansas
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compliance is one of the most basic principles of our legal system,
dating back to Marbury v. Madison.242 The Court in Marbury
famously wrote that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”243 Second, state supreme
courts have adopted this same maxim and expounded on its impor-
tance and function in the particular context of educational adequacy
and equity cases.244 When the Kentucky legislature, for instance,
argued that separation of powers prohibited the judiciary from inter-
vening in school funding disputes, the state supreme court explained
that the court’s job is:
[T]o determine the constitutional validity of the system of common
schools within the meaning of the Kentucky Constitution, Section
183. We have done so. We have declared the system of common
schools to be unconstitutional. It is now up to the General
Assembly to re-create, and re-establish a system of common schools
within this state which will be in compliance with the
Constitution.245
Third, on matters on which the constitution and state courts have
spoken, legislatures lack the authority to disagree—at least through
legislative action.246 For instance, when New York’s highest court
determined that the state constitution required educational opportuni-
ties that prepare students for college, the legislature lacked the discre-
tion to persist in the position that it thinks workplace preparedness is
sufficient and all that it will fund.247 Kansas’s Supreme Court explains
why constitutions divide power this way:
Supreme Court with “judicial overreach” and proposing constitutional amendment to
“block the court from reviewing overall spending on schools”).
242 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
243 Id. at 177.
244 See, e.g., Ex parte James, 713 So. 2d 869, 879 (Ala. 1997) (rejecting the argument that
courts are precluded from reviewing the constitutionality of Alabama’s public school
system, given that the judiciary has a duty “to review, and if necessary, nullify, acts of the
legislature it deemed to be inconsistent with the fundamental law of the land”); Gannon I,
319 P.3d 1196, 1230 (Kan. 2014) (finding that the Kansas Constitution empowers the courts
to review legislation with respect to public education); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State,
767 S.E.2d 157, 163–64 (S.C. 2014) (rejecting the argument that educational policies are
non-justiciable).
245 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 214 (Ky. 1989).
246 As William Thro explains, “[a]ll Education Clauses limit the sovereign discretion of
the legislature,” and the “judiciary must enforce those limits.” William E. Thro,
Originalism and School Finance Litigation, 335 EDUC. L. REP. 538, 552 (2016); see also
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“No state legislator . . . can war against the
Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.”).
247 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 351–56 (N.Y. 2003)
(“It is the responsibility of the State to offer the opportunity of a sound basic education,
and it is the responsibility of this Court to determine whether the State is fulfilling its
responsibility . . . .”).
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[C]onstitutional assignment of different roles to different entities
[dictates] that the people of Kansas wanted to ensure that the edu-
cation of school children in their state is not entirely dependent
upon political influence or the voters’ constant vigilance. . . .
[M]atters intended for permanence are placed in constitutions for a
reason—to protect them from the vagaries of politics or majority.248
Fourth, the requisite education funding—or the steps the state
must take in regard to funding—can become a settled issue and
beyond dispute when it intersects with the courts’ interpretation and
application of the constitution. During the early phases of litigation,
legislatures can contest the question of whether money matters and
the appropriate level of funding for the education system.249 Courts
consider states’ and plaintiffs’ extensive competing evidence on these
issues.250 But once the court evaluates and adjudicates the evidence in
the context of a constitutional standard, it is no longer subject to
debate. The state must accept and comply with the court’s decision.
More specifically, a judicial finding that current funding levels are
insufficient to deliver an adequate education is a finding that the state
has failed to discharge its constitutional duty.251 The state cannot,
after such a decision, relitigate the issue in the court of public opinion
in the hope of getting a different result. Nor can the state legitimately
justify a continued low level of education funding on the premise that
it still believes money does not matter.252
Yet, gerrymandering school funding becomes the means through
which legislatures resist and reject judicial authority, just through less
explicit means. But whether explicit or not, gerrymandering is resis-
tance nonetheless because it represents an intentional act of bad faith
248 Gannon I, 319 P.3d at 1230.
249 See Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686, at *56 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000) (accepting the state’s argument that the education problem
cannot be resolved by simply increasing funding), aff’d, 599 S.E.2d 365, 373 (N.C. 2004).
250 Rebell, supra note 9, at 1484–85.
251 See, e.g., Gannon I, 319 P.3d at 1230; Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186, 211–13 (Ky. 1989) (finding that Kentucky’s public school system “falls short of
the mark of the constitutional mandate of ‘efficient’”); McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227,
248 (Wash. 2012) (finding that Washington has a constitutional responsibility to provide
ample funding for public education).
252 To be clear, this does not mean that the constitution or judiciary deprives the
legislature of discretion on important education funding and policy issues. The legislature
is vested with wide ranging extensive discretion on these issues—far more than any other
branch—and that discretion is not subject to override by another branch of government.
The point here is that as to that narrow set of issues on which the constitution and
interpretation of it have spoken, legislatures cannot continue to actively contest those
issues without violating constitutional law. And as a constitutional violation, refusal to fund
education on these grounds is an illegitimate goal that should be struck down even under
the most minimal level of scrutiny. It is whether the legislature has actually acted on this
illegitimate basis, not whether it can do so, that should be determinative.
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as opposed to an effort to comply with a court order or precedent.
When legislators manipulate school funding based on ideological prin-
ciples or factual hypotheses that reject the settled constitutional law of
the state, they are claiming the authority for themselves to disagree
with the court’s findings.253
Here, legislators miss a key distinction that threatens separation
of powers and the rule of law: Individual legislators will always be free
to hold their own opinions, but they are not free to set state policy
that represents their opinions rather than constitutional principle.
Anarchists and authoritarians, for instance, can hold elected office,
but their election does not grant them authority to violate or ignore
the Constitution.254 Understood as efforts to resist constitutional com-
pliance, these educational gerrymanders are just as problematic as
intentional refusals to serve certain communities. Both lack any legiti-
mate justification.
The aftermath of Brown v. Board and the Court’s responses crys-
talize and confirm the foregoing logic.255 Once the Court declared
school segregation unconstitutional, schools had no authority to per-
sist in segregation.256 Nor did they have the authority to adopt dilatory
tactics aimed at avoiding the Brown holding. Most school districts,
however, did just that,257 and legislators urged them on.258 So when
253 Kansas provides one of the most blatant examples. See, e.g., Editorial Board, Nix
This Lousy Idea: Kansas Should Say No to Constitutional Amendment on School Funding,
KAN. CITY STAR (July 6, 2018), https://www.kansascity.com/opinion/editorials/
article214016379.html (“Within hours [of court ruling on school funding], conservative
lawmakers were starting to beat the drum—again—for a constitutional amendment that
would ensure that such an order from the court could never happen again.”); Jonathan
Shorman, How Much Money for Kansas Schools? Lawmakers Have No Quick Answers,
KAN. CITY STAR (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/
article177324881.html (legislators responding to court’s school funding decision by saying it
does not “recognize and respect the will of the people and those whom they have elected”
and calling the court’s decision “unsurprising as it is absurd”); see also supra notes 141–43
and accompanying text (discussing the contention between the state and the judiciary in
Kansas).
254 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (holding that the executive was
bound to comply with the Court’s constitutional holdings, not the executive’s opinion as to
what the Constitution requires).
255 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
256 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 11 (1971); Green v. Cty.
Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
257 See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FULFILLING THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF
THE LAW: DESEGREGATION OF THE NATION’S SCHOOLS 6 (1976) (finding that, a decade
after the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, less than two percent of African
Americans in the South had been admitted to schools with whites); DAVID J. MAYS, RACE,
REASON, AND MASSIVE RESISTANCE 197 (2008) (noting political candidates who ran
against integration, including Virginian governor Lindsay Almond and his “massive
resistance” slogan).
258 The Southern Manifesto, TIME, Mar. 26, 1956, at 25.
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school desegregation returned to the Court in Green v. New Kent
County259 in 1968, the Court made two points clear. First, school dis-
tricts had a constitutional duty to immediately develop plans that
would integrate schools.260 Second, schools’ failure to adopt such
plans following Brown was a constitutional violation and, thus, was a
continuing constitutional violation during those subsequent years.261
The Court made a third point in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg a
few years later: A failure to end these continuing violations justifies a
court in taking even stronger measures to remedy the constitutional
violation and assure districts’ compliance moving forward.262
This absolute mandate to integrate, however, did not mean that
states or districts lacked all direction. Rather, it meant schools and the
state lacked the discretion to avoid and resist integration, directly or
indirectly. So long as they avoided those problems, school policy dis-
cretion remained exclusively in their hands.263 But when the schools
crossed this line and refused to act in good faith toward constitutional
compliance, courts had the authority to devise an appropriate deseg-
regation remedy based on the evidence before them.264 School offi-
cials could no more resist that remedy than they could a direct
command of the Constitution.265
The parallels between desegregation and school funding are
unmistakable. In both, once courts find a constitutional violation, the
state has a duty to remedy the violation. While state actors have dis-
cretion in devising a remedy to the violation, that discretion does not
extend to efforts to avoid an effective remedy. Thus, when a court
finds that a school funding system is unconstitutional and requires
substantial additional financial resources, the state has no authority to
insist otherwise or to treat the issue of whether money matters in its
schools as one that is still subject to debate. And when a legislature
gerrymanders educational opportunity in ways that reject or contest
judicial findings and conclusions on this issue, the gerrymander repre-
sents an assertion of power that the legislature does not possess and is,
259 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
260 Id. at 435–36.
261 Id. at 438.
262 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
263 See, e.g., id. at 16 (“Remedial judicial authority does not put judges automatically in
the shoes of school authorities whose powers are plenary.”). The point was actually one of
dismay for the plaintiffs, who urged the Court to declare freedom of choice to be
unconstitutional.
264 See id. at 16 (noting that when school authorities “default [on] their obligation to
proffer acceptable remedies [to segregation], a district court has broad power to fashion a
remedy that will assure a unitary school system”).
265 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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thus, constitutionally illegitimate. Nothing less than basic separation
of power and rule of law principles compel this conclusion.
III
THE LIMITS OF CURRENT EDUCATION DOCTRINE
Scholars, advocates, and courts have viewed school funding solely
through the doctrinal lens of whether students in a particular district
are receiving an adequate or equal education. They inquire whether
students are achieving at adequate levels and, if not, whether they are
receiving the necessary resources. In other words, resources and stu-
dent outcomes drive the inquiry. These questions almost entirely
ignore states’ motivations and assume states’ good faith. State failures
to provide appropriate educational resources, then, are treated as
benign neglect that can be cured by calling a state’s attention to the
issue.
This framing and set of assumptions overlook serious problems in
education policy. First, they ignore bad faith by the state. In doing so,
they allow the state to persist in illicit behavior, asking over and over
again whether the state has met its obligation rather than whether the
state is actively subverting educational opportunity.266 Second, they
understate the severity of what states have done in education,
replacing bad faith educational gerrymandering with terms like inade-
quacy and inequity. Third and maybe most important, inadequacy and
inequity have doctrinal and rhetorical limits. The uncertainties
involved in defining, measuring, and enforcing adequacy and equity
make it hard for courts to do their job—and do it consistently. The
terms have aged and may no longer convey the moral urgency they
once did. As adequacy and equity grow in complexity, they become
less clear and potentially less compelling claims against the state.
A. Adequacy and Equity Theory
In the 1970s, school funding litigation focused on the concept of
equality of educational opportunity.267 The goal was to ensure that
students have access to the same educational resources. Equality
evolved to require that students have access to the resources they
need to achieve equal outcomes—what some call vertical equity.268
266 See, e.g., Gannon VI, 420 P.3d 477, 480–81 (Kan. 2018) (finding that Kansas
manipulated base funding by ignoring inflation).
267 See Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 493, 498–99 (1995).
268 Id. at 493, 513–19.
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Vertical equity requires that students with greater needs receive
greater resources.269
The advent of the national standards-based movement in the
1980s combined with concerns about the potential limits of equity liti-
gation led advocates to pursue adequacy claims.270 Adequacy cases
assert that there is a baseline of educational quality that all students
must receive.271 Courts further defined quality with concepts like “suf-
ficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to
function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization” and “suffi-
cient knowledge” in substantive subject matter areas to enable stu-
dents to pursue “advanced training in either academic or vocational
fields.”272 The biggest distinction from equity litigation was the
requirement that no school falls below these thresholds, not that all
schools provide the same opportunities.273
B. Separation of Power Constraints
Adequacy and equity litigation have proven incredibly successful
in key respects. By 2006, equity and adequacy litigators had won sixty
percent of the time.274 The percentage was even higher in cases filed
after 1989, as adequacy theories proved more palatable to courts.275
The litigation, however, has faced enormous challenges and suffered
enormous losses as well. The losses and challenges revolve around the
inherent separation of powers dynamics in school finance litigation
and the actual educational judgments that courts must render in the
cases.
Only legislatures can pass school funding laws and set academic
standards.276 Courts can issue opinions concluding that the current
statutory framework fails to meet the constitutional standard, but
courts cannot make the legislature enact a legislative fix.277 And for
that matter, courts are even constrained in their ability to tell a legisla-
269 Id.
270 See NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK 5 (1983)
(warning of a “rising tide of mediocrity” in American education); Christopher F. Edley, Jr.,
Lawyers and Education Reform, 28 HARV. J. LEGIS. 293, 293–94 (1991) (discussing the
debate about whether our education system is in crisis).
271 Rebell, supra note 9, at 1501.
272 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
273 Scholars and increasingly some courts would eventually recognize that equity and
adequacy cannot be entirely separated. Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus
Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477, 478–79 (2014).
274 Rebell, supra note 9, at 1500.
275 Id. at 1527.
276 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 214.
277 See Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in
Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. C.R. &
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ture exactly what the fix should be.278 The problem is further exacer-
bated in those states where the constitutional education clause
suggests that the legislature is the sole arbiter of what amounts to an
appropriate education279 or where the clause’s key terms are vague
and skeptics claim the courts are making up educational standards.280
Even the clearest constitutional language and most forceful
courts cannot make these problems go away. The supreme courts in
Kansas and Washington, for instance, have revealed the limits of judi-
cial power, no matter how aggressively courts assert those powers.
Other courts intentionally refrain from making specific demands of
their legislature.281 Some courts have grown weary and find, with little
to no factual basis, that whatever the state has done is constitutionally
sufficient.282 During and immediately following the recession, passivist
and deferential judicial decisionmaking increased sharply, suggesting
that courts may be losing their will to enforce their state
constitutions.283
C.L. 83, 114–15 (2010) (discussing the Texas Supreme Court’s threat to shut down the
schools if the state did not pass legislation).
278 See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 59–60 (N.Y. 2006)
(“Judicial intervention in the state budget may be invoked only in the narrowest of
instances.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599
S.E.2d 365, 397 (N.C. 2004) (remanding the case to “the legislature and executive,” and
noting that it is up to those branches to “step forward, boldly and decisively, to see that all
children . . . have an educational opportunity and experience . . . that . . . meets the
constitutional mandates”).
279 Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1189 (Ill. 1996).
280 See, e.g., Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 541 (S.C. 1999) (Moore,
J., dissenting) (“Our Education Clause requires only that the General Assembly ‘provide
for the [support and maintenance] of a system of free public schools.’ It contains no
directive regarding the quality or adequacy of the education that must be provided.”
(quoting S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3)).
281 See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 214 (declaring the then public school system as
unconstitutional but leaving the legislature broad discretion to build the new system);
Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 178 (S.C. 2014) (noting that the redress is
“to be made by the General Assembly as to how best to provide our State’s students their
opportunity for a minimally adequate education”).
282 See, e.g., Order, Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 2007-065159 (S.C. Nov. 17,
2017), http://schoolfunding.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/5a130bddd6089.pdf
(withdrawing jurisdiction in a twenty-year-old case but pointing to no significant remedy
by the state).
283 These separation of powers issues have flummoxed scholars for decades. See, e.g.,
Bauries, supra note 33, at 730–31 (discussing academic debates as to the merits of judicial
deference in this type of case); William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional
Constraints: A Re-Examination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance
Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1259–61 (2003) (discussing the
appropriateness of judicial deference in school financing cases).
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C. The Factual Ambiguity of Adequacy and Equity
While much has been said about the separation of powers
issue,284 the existing literature has done little to resolve the underlying
problem that, even placing separation of powers limits aside, ade-
quacy and equity are difficult doctrinal concepts for courts to apply.
Courts must first decide what those terms mean.285 Courts can rela-
tively easily define adequacy in general terms but defining it more
specifically involves a level of judgment. And no matter what, mea-
suring whether students are receiving an adequate education is fact-
intensive and involves matters of degree.286 Equity on its face might
appear simpler, but it is not. By equity, courts mean equitable access
to the resources that students need.287 According to various courts,
different students and districts need different resources.288 Those dif-
ferential needs are just as difficult to define and measure as adequacy.
In older cases, abject underfunding, rotting buildings, and swaths
of uncertified teachers made it easy for courts to find that a state was
failing to meet its constitutional duty.289 The state’s effort was paltry,
and education conditions were pathetic. These egregious circum-
stances would fail under almost any concept of equality or adequacy a
court might devise. But under less egregious facts, courts must identify
and apply more precise lines between adequacy and inadequacy,
which means they increasingly rely more heavily on outside experts
for the key assessments on which the cases turn. Most notably, courts
rely on state and outside experts for estimates of what it costs to
deliver an education. When they differ—as they always do—courts
must determine who is more credible, who is owed deference, or if the
truth lies somewhere in between the experts’ views.290 Dealing with
these issues over the course of several cases and years challenges
courts’ institutional capacity and can undermine courts’ confidence in
their ability to compel positive change.291 It is not unusual for a court,
having previously declared an education system unconstitutional, to
284 See, e.g., Black, supra note 35, at 456.
285 See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 214 (noting the definition of “efficient” education
system); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997) (noting a few factors that are
relevant to determining “adequacy”).
286 Koski, supra note 283, at 1234–37.
287 See Weishart, supra note 273, at 501–04 (discussing equity in terms of financial
resources).
288 Id. at 505–07.
289 See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 743 (Ohio 1997) (describing teachers
falling through floors and desks covered with coal dust).
290 See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 334 (N.Y. 2003).
291 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1113 (N.J. 2011) (Rivera-Soto, J.,
dissenting).
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inexplicably find that a state has achieved compliance a few years
later, even though the state has done very little to comply and experts
indicate more remains to be done.292
Texas is one of the worst examples in recent years. After two
decades of litigation and decisions in which it had ordered the state to
improve its school funding system and the state had responded with
varying degrees of success,293 the Texas Supreme Court basically gave
up in 2016. It overturned a trial court decision that had found that
Texas schools were underfunded by $3.7 billion in 2010 and would be
even more underfunded in the future.294 The Texas Supreme Court
justified its reversal by asserting that the connection between money
and student outcomes was far too uncertain for it to continue to inter-
vene.295 Even the New Jersey Supreme Court, traditionally the
strongest education rights court in the country,296 has struggled in
recent years. In one case on remand, a trial court found that $1.6 bil-
lion in school funding cuts had “moved many districts further away
from ‘adequacy’” and imposed the greatest burdens on at-risk stu-
dents,297 but there was only one vote on the court to restore statewide
funding for at-risk students.298 In dissenting, one justice wanted to end
school funding litigation in the state altogether.299
Such decisions reflect how concepts like adequacy are malleable
and difficult to administer. They are malleable enough for courts to
demand enormous increases in school funding one year only to walk
away from striking down even larger budget cuts a few years later.
Substantial evidence indicates that most state funding regularly falls
292 See, e.g., Morath v. Texas Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex.
2016) (finding Texas legislature’s decisions constitutional despite marginal improvements).
293 Between 1989 and 2005 alone, the Texas Supreme Court had issued six positive
school finance decisions. See, e.g., Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176
S.W.3d 746, 752 (Tex. 2005); W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alanis, 107
S.W.3d 558, 562–63 (Tex. 2003); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 725
(Tex. 1995); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.,
826 S.W.2d 489, 492–93 (Tex. 1992); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491,
492–93 (Tex. 1991); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 391–92 (Tex.
1989).
294 Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 850.
295 Id. at 850–51.
296 See generally Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey’s
Experience Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 615 (2004)
(discussing a quarter century of school finance litigation in the state, which included
numerous decisions against the state, major legislative overhauls, and concrete remedial
demands).
297 Abbott, 20 A.3d at 1035.
298 See id. at 1101 (concurring judge favoring a state-wide remedy but joining the
majority to ensure a remedy for a narrower group of districts).
299 See id. at 1110 (arguing that the litigation was “well-intentioned but now
fundamentally flawed”).
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below levels necessary to achieve what experts deem adequate,300 but
no firm standard or data point mandates that a court intervene. Thus,
courts operate within an enormous gray area, leaving them subject to
enormous pressure. They are accused of judicial activism when they
intervene and abdication when they do not.301
The combined weight of these challenges helps explain why
courts began intervening less frequently and less forcefully in the last
decade. The shift in outcomes was hard to explain on the facts
alone.302 Equity and adequacy claims may have simply pushed courts
to the limits of their institutional capacity and authority.303 Courts
were less sure of their judgment calls, less sure they could compel
states to act, and thus more interested in finding bases upon which to
remove themselves from ongoing litigation. As two New Jersey
Supreme Court justices wrote:
[T]his Court embarked on an initially well-intentioned but now fun-
damentally flawed and misguided approach [in 1973] to addressing
the New Jersey Constitution’s promise that ‘[t]he Legislature shall
provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient
system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in
the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.’304
D. The Viability of Future Adequacy and Equity Claims
The future of school finance litigation is, of course, impossible to
predict. Courts may very well learn their lessons and find ways to
moderately advance more effective reform and educational accounta-
bility. There have been significant new victories more recently.305 But
one cannot discount the possibility that school finance is running a
natural lifespan that will not end well. The history of school desegre-
gation offers an obvious analogy.
The depth and obvious nature of the original harms of school seg-
regation made demanding legal standards and aggressive judicial
intervention entirely appropriate to all but the most conservative ele-
300 See, e.g., BAKER ET AL., supra note 6, at 1.
301 See Koski, supra note 283, at 1240 (discussing judicial activism and restraint); Thro,
supra note 246, at 550–51 (concluding Kentucky’s supreme court engaged in activism, but
other courts abdicate their duty).
302 Black, supra note 35, at 453–58 (discussing the reversals of course in Colorado,
Kansas, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington).
303 See Koski, supra note 283, at 1296–97 (concluding that courts have grown cognizant
of their institutional limitations in school funding cases).
304 Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1110 (N.J. 2011) (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting).
305 See, e.g., Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2018) (finding that the
education clause is justiciable); William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d
414, 457 (Pa. 2017) (finding that the State’s education clause is justiciable and reversing
prior holdings of the court).
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ments in the early years of desegregation. Between Brown v. Board of
Education in 1954 and Swann v. Mecklenburg in 1971, every one of
the Court’s desegregation decisions was unanimous.306 But that una-
nimity eventually fractured, and the gaps in judicial perspectives wid-
ened.307 In the mid-1970s, a slim majority on the Supreme Court
emerged to focus on factual nuances and new legal distinctions to end
desegregation.308 Later, members of the Court began to openly ques-
tion both the efficacy and legitimacy of desegregation remedies and
emphasize the need to return control to local districts.309 Most
recently in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1, the Court went so far as to even limit schools’ ability to
voluntarily desegregate.310 Today, the effects of desegregation are
diminished by the end of court oversight.311
This trajectory was foretold as early as 1973 by a basic legal con-
cept. In Keyes v. School District No. 1, the Court held that the judi-
ciary could only remedy intentional, not de facto, segregation.312 This
distinction became the basis for immediately limiting and preventing
desegregation in the North and the basis upon which desegregation
would end nationwide in the 1990s.313 This result may have been inev-
306 Steven L. Nelson & Alison C. Tyler, Examining Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission v. School District of Philadelphia: Considering How the Supreme Court’s
Waning Support of School Desegregation Affected Desegregation Efforts Based on State
Law, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1049, 1053–55 (2017) (surveying the Court’s decisions in
those years).
307 Id.
308 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 753 (1974) (holding that inter-district busing,
as mandated by the lower courts, was not an appropriate remedy for a single district’s
purposeful acts of segregation, and remanding for “prompt formulation of a decree
directed to eliminating the segregation found to exist in Detroit city schools”); Keyes v.
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 93 S. Ct. 2686, 2691 (1973) (focusing on population compositions to
analyze discrimination).
309 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99 (1995) (“[L]ocal autonomy of school
districts is a vital national tradition.”); id. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning the
social science evidence regarding the harms of segregation and the judiciary’s order of
integrative remedies); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992) (“[T]he court’s end
purpose must be to remedy the violation and, in addition, to restore state and local
authorities to the control of a school system.”); id. at 490 (“Returning schools to the
control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date is essential to restore their true
accountability in our governmental system.”).
310 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2742 (2007) (holding that strict scrutiny applies to voluntary
desegregation plans that rely on racial classifications and that the instant plans were
unconstitutional).
311 Sean F. Reardon et al., Brown Fades: The End of Court-Ordered School
Desegregation and the Resegregation of American Public Schools, 31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 876, 901 (2012).
312 93 S. Ct. 2686, 2689–90 (1973).
313 See generally Erica Frankenberg & Kendra Taylor, De Facto Segregation: Tracing a
Legal Basis for Contemporary Inequality, 47 J.L. & EDUC. 189 (2018) (discussing how the
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itable, but it may have also resulted from the failure to identify new
theories upon which desegregation could continue or evolve. Without
an evolved theory, the legitimacy of desegregation remained moored
to the concepts of original segregation (which necessarily grew distant
in time) and racial balance (which proved ever-elusive).314
The possibility that school finance litigation will follow this trajec-
tory is real. School finance litigation strikes at the heart of the state’s
central government function, demands enormous and ongoing reme-
dies, and relies on contested concepts of adequacy and equity. While
adequacy and equity theories have been enormously powerful, there is
no guarantee that their combined normative power will persist or that
courts can perpetually enforce them. Equity litigation itself largely
gave way to adequacy, which proved even more successful.315
Brown’s mild concept of non-discrimination similarly gave way to
Green v. New Kent County’s command that districts affirmatively fur-
ther integration and stamp out the vestiges of desegregation.316 The
principles of Green dramatically accelerated integration but also even-
tually required more judicial intervention than the courts or the public
would tolerate.317 It is altogether possible, if not likely, that adequacy
and equity litigation’s recent struggles are reflections of the fact that
they make enormous demands of courts and legislatures, which are
not counterbalanced by sufficient normative forces. Absent a counter-
balance, the movements will wane in the long run.
IV
THEORIZING AN ANTI-GERRYMANDERING DOCTRINE IN
EDUCATION
Educational inequality and unfairness challenges have almost
uniformly failed under the Federal Constitution because the appli-
cable level of scrutiny is rational basis. State constitutional claims have
succeeded in most instances but largely ignore educational gerryman-
dering as a distinct problem. The only question in state cases is the
final education outcome—adequacy and equity. The focus on those
outcomes obscures the damage that gerrymandering has on educa-
tional opportunity. Gerrymandering makes it more difficult for courts
requirement of intentional discrimination has stymied the elimination of school
segregation).
314 See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1437 (1992).
315 Rebell, supra note 9, at 1500–01.
316 See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
317 See generally DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 150–66 (5th ed.
2004) (tracing the Court’s precedent from Green through the retreats during the Nixon
administration and then again in the 1990s).
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to measure and monitor adequacy and equity, as well as enforce com-
pliance with those constitutional mandates. An anti-gerrymandering
framework can attack and prohibit these education failures.
A close examination of Supreme Court doctrine, as well as state
constitutional education principles, reveals that educational gerryman-
dering is unconstitutional under both federal and state law. It is
unconstitutional under federal equal protection doctrine because edu-
cational gerrymandering is the product of illegitimate state motives.
Even under the most permissive form of review—rational basis—
states cannot intentionally target groups for disadvantage just for the
sake of doing so. Nor, as this Article demonstrates, can states muster a
legitimate or logical goal for subverting their state constitutional
duties regarding education. Thus, this subversion is unconstitutional
under both federal and state constitutional law because the state lacks
a legitimate justification for its action. The following sections detail
the precedent and doctrines that buttress these principles.
A. Equal Protection’s Prohibition on Intentionally Disadvantaging
Groups
As a general principle, educational inequalities, save those moti-
vated by race or gender, only trigger rational basis review under fed-
eral equal protection analysis.318 Rational basis review is so
deferential to the state that lower courts, advocates, and scholars
rarely pay it serious attention.319 This lack of attention is a mistake.
The Court has, in fact, struck down legislation under rational basis
review even absent facial discrimination on the basis of race or
gender.
Rational basis review is not a searching form of review.320 Plain-
tiffs bear a heavy burden.321 They must rule out the notion that the
state is pursuing any conceivable legitimate purpose.322 Courts will
even assume the possibility of purposes that the state may not have
raised itself.323 So long as some legitimate goal exists, the state’s
318 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
319 See, e.g., Brian B. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 230 F.3d 582, 586 (3d Cir. 2000); Aaron
Belzer, Putting the “Review” Back in Rational Basis Review, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 339, 346
(2014).
320 Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 611–12 (2000).
321 F.C.C. v. Beach Comm’ns, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101–02 (1993) (requiring under rational
basis review that “those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the
burden ‘to negate every conceivable basis which might support it’” (citation omitted)).
322 Id.
323 Id.
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actions need only minimally advance the legitimate goal.324 There
need not even be a good fit between the state’s goal and the means it
chose to advance it.325
This deference makes perfect sense. It is not the judiciary’s role
to supervise and second-guess everyday legislation simply because of
its incidental and unequal effects.326 Policymakers necessarily draw
lines in legislation and practice.327 Those lines inevitably disparately
affect certain individuals and groups.328 But not all legislation is
benign in its effects, even if it does not involve invidious racial or
gender-based discrimination. States sometimes inject rather unusual
distinctions and disadvantages into law. When framed as such, the
Court has been willing to strike down these legislative oddities.329
Some state policies and goals are simply off limits.330 The Court
has explained that certain fundamental norms and principles underpin
the Constitution and, more specifically, equal protection. These norms
and principles operate as limits, regardless of the particular classifica-
tion the state may draw. The Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans best
articulated the core principle relevant to this Article, writing:
Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection is the principle that
government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to
all who seek its assistance. . . . A law declaring that in general it shall
be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek
aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the
laws in the most literal sense.331
The Court in Romer was not the first to seize on this idea and
built on much earlier and, sometimes more mundane, cases. In 1928 in
Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, for instance, the Court
324 See N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 99 S. Ct. 1355, 1368–69 (1979).
325 Id. at 1370.
326 Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1993).
327 Id.
328 See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 69 S. Ct. 463 (1949) (noting that a New
York law “draws the line between” advertisements on trucks and general advertising).
329 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221–22 (1982); U.S.
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535–36 (1973).
330 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (finding that “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group” is an illegitimate government goal); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223–24 (holding
that targeting undocumented students for exclusion from school is illegitimate); Moreno,
413 U.S. at 535–36 (same); see also Magoun v. Ill. Trust & Sav. Bank, 18 S. Ct. 594, 598
(1898) (“Clear and hostile discriminations against particular persons and classes, especially
such as are of unusual character, unknown to the practice of our governments, might be
obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition[.]” (quoting Bell’s Gap R.R. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 240 (1890))).
331 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
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wrote that “the equal protection clause means that the rights of all
persons must rest upon the same rule under similar circumstances.”332
This idea later became the basis to strike down more invidious forms
of discrimination, such as racial discrimination. The rationale in the
Court’s early race discrimination cases was not that race classifications
were inherently suspect, but that under certain circumstances they
violated the basic rationale of equal protection.333 In Shelley v.
Kraemer, a case involving racially restrictive housing covenants, the
Court reasoned that “[e]qual protection of the laws is not achieved
through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.”334 The Court
focused on the oddity, unusualness, and apparent randomness of the
inequality in striking down the restrictive covenants. The Court would
later quote that same language in Sweatt v. Painter to explain why
Texas could not exclude African Americans from its law school (even
though segregation as a general principle remained constitutional).335
In each of these cases, the Court relied not simply on heightened scru-
tiny, but on the intrinsic meaning of equality itself.336
A further synthesized statement of these basic concepts is that
the state cannot purposefully single out groups for unfavorable treat-
ment and hardships. Or, as the Court wrote in Romer, the state cannot
draw classifications “for the purpose of disadvantaging the group bur-
dened by the law.”337 Such a purpose is constitutionally illegitimate
regardless of the group targeted or the level of scrutiny.338 The Court
332 48 S. Ct. 423 (1928); Magoun, 18 S. Ct. at 598 (writing that equal protection
“prescribes that the law have the attribute of equality of operation, and equality of
operation does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons, merely as such, but on
persons according to their relations”). Writing in concurrence in a rational basis review
case, Justice Jackson wrote that “there is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.” Ry. Express Agency,
69 S. Ct. at 466–67.
333 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950); Shelley v. Kraemer, 68 S. Ct. 836, 846
(1948); see also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1975) (“[S]ingl[ing] out and
expressly den[ying] by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law . . .
is an impediment to securing to [the African American] race that equal justice which the
law aims to secure to all others.”).
334 68 S. Ct. at 846.
335 Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635.
336 Id. Respect for this principle explains why laws singling out a certain class of citizens
for disfavored legal status or general hardships are rare. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 62 S. Ct.
1110, 1113 (1942).
337 Romer v. Evans, 413 U.S. 620, 633 (1996); see also U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 101 S.
Ct. 453, 462 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“If the adverse impact on the disfavored class
is an apparent aim of the legislature, its impartiality would be suspect.”).
338 As the Court in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer explained, “[T]he Court’s
equal protection cases have recognized a distinction between ‘invidious discrimination’—
i.e., classifications drawn ‘with an evil eye and an unequal hand’ or motivated by ‘a feeling
41816-nyu_94-6 Sheet No. 33 Side A      12/10/2019   14:44:50
41816-nyu_94-6 Sheet No. 33 Side A      12/10/2019   14:44:50
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-6\NYU601.txt unknown Seq: 61  6-DEC-19 15:20
December 2019] EDUCATIONAL GERRYMANDERING 1445
made this point in both Romer and United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, explaining that the singling out of groups for
disadvantage represents no more than “a bare . . . desire to harm a
politically unpopular group.”339 It did not matter that the singling
targeted “hippies” in Moreno, rather than race or sex.340 What mat-
tered was that the case involved a desire to disfavor a group just for
the sake of doing so—a purpose that the Court reasoned was unequiv-
ocally unconstitutional.341
In recent years, a similar concept has also moved into voting
rights doctrine. While voting rights doctrine on the subject is still in
flux and the precise lines of permissible behavior have yet to be
drawn,342 the Court’s normative concerns reflect the equal protection
ideology of the foregoing cases. Previously, race was the only factor
that the courts had found to be problematic in the context of
redrawing voting districts.343
Courts, however, have increasingly grown skeptical about voting
practices whose sole purpose is to disadvantage or subjugate partic-
ular groups of voters. The Supreme Court has denounced the motives
that drive gerrymandering as constitutionally illegitimate.344 Justin
Levitt explains that while the Court may disagree on how much gerry-
mandering is too much, “all nine Justices [in Vieth v. Jubelirer] agreed
that ‘an excessive injection of politics’ in the redistricting process vio-
lates the Constitution.”345 The district court in Gill v. Whitford simi-
larly concluded that “[w]hatever gray may span the area between
of antipathy’ against, a specific group of residents—and those special rules that ‘are often
necessary for general benefits.’” 99 S. Ct. 1355, 1369 n.40 (1979) (internal citations
omitted).
339 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634; U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535–36 (1973).
340 In Moreno, Congress took action to make it harder for “hippies” to enroll in the
food stamp program. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535–36. The text of the law in Moreno did not
draw a “hippie” distinction, but its underlying motivation and effect was to exclude them
from welfare assistance. Id.
341 Id. at 534; see also Beazer, 99 S. Ct. at 1367 (framing the inquiry in a rational basis
case as “whether the [challenged] rule reflects an impermissible bias against a special
class”); id. at 1369 (reasoning the policy in question was constitutional because “[i]t is
neither unprincipled nor invidious in the sense that it implies disrespect for the excluded
subclass”); id. (emphasizing that the legislation was not targeted at a “class of persons
characterized by some unpopular trait or affiliation” and thus does not “reflect any special
likelihood of bias on the part of the ruling majority”).
342 Many believed the Court would finally announce a standard for prohibiting
gerrymandering in 2018, but the Court remanded a promising case based on a standing
issue. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
343 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816,
2817–18 (1993).
344 See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
2652, 2658 (2015) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004)).
345 Levitt, supra note 23, at 1999 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293).
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acceptable and excessive [gerrymandering], an intent to entrench a
political party in power signals an excessive injection of politics into
the redistricting process that impinges on the representational rights
of those associated with the party out of power.”346
The constitutional norm limiting gerrymandering parallels the
rationale of Romer and Moreno. Lower courts articulate the problem
of gerrymandering as being “intentional discrimination against an
identifiable political group.”347 States have targeted a group for gerry-
mandering to “subordinate” the group and “entrench” the power of
their competitor.348 The net result of this subordination is directly
analogous to Romer. In Romer, the result was to make it “more diffi-
cult for one group of citizens . . . to seek aid from the government.”349
In voting, the result is to make “state government . . . impervious to
the interests of citizens” who identify with a particular political
group.350 This “tribal partisanship,” as leading scholars term it, cannot
be a legitimate end in itself.351 Even in redistricting, where partisan-
ship inherently plays a role, subordinating a group for the sake of
doing so flies in the face of numerous constitutional norms, including
the First Amendment, Equal Protection, Substantive Due Process,
and the basic rule of law.352 As such, it is nothing short of an “abuse of
power” that lies at the core of the Court’s approach to
gerrymandering.353
The primary value of the gerrymandering comparison is simply to
recognize that active government manipulations that disadvantage a
group, whether in voting, food stamps, or housing, are constitutionally
346 Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 887 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2018).
347 Id. at 884 (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986)).
348 Id. at 886 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2658).
349 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
350 Election Law—Partisan Gerrymandering—District Court Offers New Standard to
Hold Wisconsin Redistricting Scheme Unconstitutional.—Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-
bbc, 2016 WL 6837229 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2016)., 130 HARV. L. REV. 1954, 1957 (2017)
(quoting Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 886).
351 Kang, supra note 23, at 353.
352 See Levitt, supra note 23, at 2023–24.
353 Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 885–86; see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015) (defining partisan gerrymandering as
“the drawing of legislative district lines to subordinate adherents of one political party and
entrench a rival party in power”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (indicating that gerrymandering involves the application of
political classifications “in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate
legislative objective”); id. at 293 (plurality opinion) (“[A]n excessive injection of politics is
unlawful.”); id. at 362 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[G]errymandering that leads to
entrenchment amounts to an abuse that violates the Constitution’s Equal Protection
Clause.”).
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suspect. And gerrymandering, by its very name, involves acts of
manipulation and, thus, arouse constitutional suspicion. In its non-
voting equal protection cases, the Court frequently comments on the
odd and unusual manner in which the state singled out a group.354 The
oddity of the legislation itself alerts the Court to the likelihood that
the governmental action is illegitimate. Legitimate government
actions do not rely upon such unusual methods. In other words, the
point of gerrymandering, regardless of the context, is to engage in
illicit behavior.
The Court in Romer, for instance, noted that the legislation in
question contained a “peculiar property” and an “unusual char-
acter.”355 The law was “exceptional” in that it “impos[ed] a broad and
undifferentiated” burden on a single group.356 And it is, quite simply,
“not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort.”357
The Court in United States v. Windsor similarly emphasized that
Congress had gone out of its way to defy federalism traditions and
target a group. Congress refused to recognize same sex couples’ mar-
riage even though their home states had done so—a judgment to
which Congress has always deferred in the past.358 The Court, again,
recognized this was an “unusual deviation” from tradition.359 Nor was
this just a post facto justification for striking down anti-gay legislation
under rational basis review. The Court warned nearly a century ago in
the most mundane of contexts—mortgage taxes—that
“[d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful
consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the consti-
tutional provision.”360
In sum, the holding and underlying rationale in these cases repre-
sents four simple tenets. First, purposefully targeting or singling out a
group is an illegitimate government goal, even if the group is not a
class that otherwise warrants heightened scrutiny. Second, absent
some other obvious explanation, legislation and practices that rely on
some unusual form to create distinctions or divisions between groups
are suspect because such unusual state activity signals an illicit motive
to create an in-group and out-group. Third, while traditional animus
may motivate state action to single out a group, the absence of animus
354 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 632 (1996); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
355 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632–33 (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S.
32, 37–38 (1928)).
356 Id. at 632.
357 Id. at 633.
358 Windsor, 570 U.S. at 767.
359 Id. at 770.
360 Coleman, 277 U.S. at 37–38.
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does not mean the state action is constitutional. Rather, the act of
singling out a group can be problematic in and of itself. The state still
needs some legitimate basis for its action and that basis will be missing
if the state’s only purpose is to disadvantage a group. Fourth, the
method and effect by which the state singles out a group can take
many forms. The state might make it harder for a group to secure
favorable legislative action, request the assistance of law enforcement,
win an election, or access governmental benefits and services. The
form and substance of the government action, no matter how obscure,
may still amount to targeted disadvantage.
B. The Anti-Disadvantage Principle in Education
1. Synthesizing Plyler v. Doe
The foregoing rational basis principles explain the Supreme
Court’s most doctrinally perplexing education case, Plyler v. Doe.361
Plyler is the only case in which the Court has ever struck down an
education policy or practice as irrational. The doctrine, theory, and
legitimacy of the Court’s holding in Plyler has long been debated.
Conservative commentators and jurists argue the case was wrongly
decided and targeted it for reversal.362 More liberal scholars and advo-
cates would stretch the Court’s holding further,363 using it as support
for other education rights theories. Both sides misunderstand or over-
look a major aspect of the case’s foundation because they read too
much into it. The simpler explanation is that Plyler rests on basic
equal protection principles rather than announces new expanded
ones. The reaffirmation of foundational rational basis review princi-
ples in Plyler does, however, make clear that a limiting principle on
certain educational inequalities exists.
Plyler involved a Texas statute that barred undocumented chil-
dren from attending public school.364 Despite the troubling facts,
plaintiffs’ likelihood of litigation success was low. The Court’s prior
361 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
362 See Michael J. Perry, Equal Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual Agenda
of Constitutional Theory: Reflections on, and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REV.
329 (1983) (arguing that Plyler was not an issue which should have been decided by the
Court).
363 See Class Action Complaint at 14–16, Gary B. v. Snyder, No. 2:16-cv-13292-SJM-
APP (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2016) (using Plyler to argue for equal opportunity to attain
basic literacy skills); Complaint at 51–55, Martinez v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-01439-AWT (D.
Conn. Aug. 23, 2016) (using Plyler to support an argument for the recognition of education
as a fundamental right); Jaclyn Brickman, Note, Educating Undocumented Children in the
United States: Codification of Plyler v. Doe Through Federal Legislation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 385 (2006).
364 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205.
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holding in San Antonio v. Rodriguez that education is not a funda-
mental right meant that general challenges to educational inequalities
would only trigger rational basis review.365 Separate Supreme Court
precedent also indicated that discrimination based on immigration
status did not trigger heightened review either.366 The fact that the
Court, nonetheless, struck down the Texas statute begs for an
explanation.367
Texas had made the traditional defenses necessary under the min-
imal standard of review. It offered cost savings and improving educa-
tion as its goals for excluding undocumented students.368 As
obnoxious as the legislation was, the state’s stated goals are legiti-
mate369 and excluding undocumented students could minimally fur-
ther them.370 A minimal connection to a legitimate goal has long been
recognized as sufficient to meet rational basis review.371
The fact that Texas’s otherwise sufficient justification failed sug-
gests that Plyler rests on an underlying unstated principle. Some argue
that Plyler stands for the proposition that while education is not a
fundamental right, our  Constitution protects some minimal level of
educational access.372 Total exclusion from education, thus, drew spe-
cial attention. Others conclude that Plyler represents a hybrid prin-
ciple under which the Court applies slightly more rigorous rational
basis review.373 They reason that the relative importance of education
combined with class-based legislation “threatens the creation of an
365 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
366 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
367 Id. at 230.
368 Id. at 209.
369 Id. at 227.
370 See id. at 250 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Perry, supra note 362, at 338.
371 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973) (stating that a
law “may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly effectuates the State’s goals”);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970) (rejecting the argument that equal
protection invalidates a law simply for “overreaching” in its application).
372 See Daniel S. Greenspahn, A Constitutional Right to Learn: The Uncertain Allure of
Making a Federal Case out of Education, 59 S.C. L. REV. 755, 769, 773 (2008); see also
Louise Weinberg, A General Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1057, 1116–18 (2013) (suggesting that Plyler also involved an
implicit due process analysis).
373 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 236, 238 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining “the unique
characteristics of the cases before us” and reasoning that “[o]ur review in a case such as
these is properly heightened”); see, e.g., Mary Jean Moltenbrey, Alternative Models of
Equal Protection Analysis: Plyler v. Doe, 24 B.C. L. REV. 1363, 1366 (1983) (writing that
Plyler “indicates a strong shift away from a strict two-tiered equal protection analysis and
toward the use of a balancing approach”); Michael A. Rebell, The Right to Comprehensive
Educational Opportunity, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 47, 97–100 (2012) (arguing that
Plyler represents the application of intermediate scrutiny).
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underclass” and, thus, triggered this rigorous rational basis review.374
This reasoning draws on the notion first articulated by Justice
Marshall in dissent in San Antonio that while education may not be a
fundamental right, it is sufficiently important to trigger a review more
rigorous than rational basis.375 In other words, the result in Plyler
rests on the unique importance of education.
Equal protection’s general anti-disadvantage and manipulation
principles, however, provide a much simpler explanation for Plyler.
They also make some new implicit doctrine superfluous and unneces-
sary. While language in Plyler discussing the importance of education
hints at the possibility of an implied doctrine,376 the Texas statute is
unconstitutional because the state imposed a special burden on a
group primarily, if not exclusively, for the sake of doing so. Purported
cost savings and educational improvements were but window-dressing
for the state’s motive to burden undocumented immigrants.377 Texas
did not want those students in its schools and sought to rid itself of
them through legislative action. The Court recognized as much.378
That recognition alone resolves the case.
This type of goal, whether it be in education or some other con-
text, is one the state simply cannot pursue. The fact that the state’s
policy might somehow have the incidental effect of producing other-
wise legitimate cost savings cannot save such a policy. On this point,
Plyler aligns perfectly with Romer. In Romer, Colorado argued that
barring sexual orientation claims would allow it to focus more on com-
batting other forms of discrimination.379 This is a legitimate goal and
the Colorado law could marginally advance it, but the Court strikes it
down anyway because an illicit motive to disadvantage a group was
also present. These parallels are strong evidence that Plyler’s holding
does not rest on the importance of education or the consequences of
the state’s action—whether it be the creation of an underclass or
actual potential savings for the state in the short term. Plyler falls
squarely within the general principle that the state cannot single out a
group for unfavorable treatment just for the sake of doing so. All of
374 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239.
375 Marshall argued that the Court should stop trying to place rights into the rigid
categories of fundamental or non-fundamental and the strict versus rational basis review
they trigger. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–100 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). He argued for a nuanced sliding scale approach to equal
protection. Id.
376 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (emphasizing “the importance of education in maintaining our
basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child”).
377 Id. at 228.
378 Id.
379 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
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Plyler’s other explanations and implications are, in effect, icing on the
cake.
Yet, none of this is to say that rational basis review ignores con-
text. All standards are applied in the context of real facts and circum-
stances that can lead to different conclusions. The unique and unusual
nature of the legislative bar on sexual orientation in Romer could only
be fully appreciated in light of the broader context of anti-
discrimination norms and cultural fights afoot in Colorado.380 The
same is true of Plyler. One must appreciate education and immigra-
tion’s context to fully appreciate the fact that Texas was illegitimately
targeting students for disfavor. The next Section draws on this insight
and reveals how evolving state constitutional education norms create
a context in which equal protection demands more impartiality than
states are providing.
2. Affirmative Impartiality
Unlike its various other functions, states have an affirmative obli-
gation under their state constitutions to provide education.381 This
affirmative obligation necessarily alters how rational basis applies to
education. Whereas a state can decide to build a new park in a remote
county even though it has no parks in other areas of the state, the
state’s affirmative education obligation strips it of this level of discre-
tion in education. States must provide education in all communities.382
Under many state constitutions, that education must also meet some
qualitative standard.383 In this context, rational basis review can also
require the state to pay more to remedy the unequal burdens it
imposes on students.
380 See also Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–25 (summarizing the historical background of the
referendum). See generally Dirk Johnson, Colorado Homosexuals Feel Betrayed, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 8, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/08/us/colorado-homosexuals-feel-
betrayed.html (discussing the statewide referendum to prevent protections for
homosexuals and the responses to the referendum’s passage).
381 See William E. Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1661 (1989)
(detailing the constitutional right to education in all fifty states, except Mississippi).
382 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“The legislature shall by general law establish
and maintain a system of public schools open to all children of the State . . . .”); COLO.
CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the
establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools
throughout the state . . . .”); NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 2 (“The legislature shall provide for a
uniform system of common schools, by which a school shall be established and maintained
in each school district . . . .”).
383 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861
N.E.2d 50, 53 (N.Y. 2006); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997); Rebell, supra
note 9, at 1509–10.
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It is not enough that the state refrains from singling out groups
for exclusion from the education system.384 The state may also be obli-
gated to avoid making it more difficult for some groups and communi-
ties to receive the educational benefits to which they are entitled.385
Referencing citizens’ right to petition government on equal grounds,
Romer phrased equal protection as a guarantee that “government and
each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its
assistance.”386 In the context of education, that statement might be
rephrased as: Government must ensure the baseline education
required by the state constitution is available to all on impartial terms.
This impartiality, however, is far short of a principle that would
treat education as a fundamental right or apply strict scrutiny to all
educational inequalities. Those principles would overturn government
policy based solely on its effects. Impartiality concerns pertain more
to illicit governmental purposes. Moreno and Romer, for instance, bar
unusual deviations in public policy whose purpose is to classify indi-
viduals for the sake of doing so, to burden them, or to make them
unequal.387 Thus, an impartiality guarantee in education does not
affirmatively guarantee equal outcomes. Instead, it creates a negative
right against state policies whose purpose is to further or reinforce
inequality, to avoid the state’s constitutional duty to provide educa-
tion, or to create roadblocks to some students’ access to education.
More succinctly, impartiality does not require equal educational out-
comes; it requires that the state not try to make them unequal.
The Washington Supreme Court captured the line between these
two things, but through a different lens. The Court offered this simple
statement: The state “must act pursuant to the constitutional mandate
to discharge its [education] duty.”388 This means that some ends,
which might be legitimate in other contexts, are not in education.389 In
384 See Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1285 (Conn. 1996) (holding that the absence of
an intent to discriminate or segregate was an insufficient defense to plaintiff’s claim that
they had been denied their right to equal education).
385 See Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 485 (N.J. 1998) (recognizing the state has an
affirmative duty to address educational deficiencies).
386 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
387 Id.; U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
388 McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 247 (Wash. 2012) (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
State, 585 P.2d 71, 96 (Wash. 1978)).
389 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 208 (Ky. 1989)
(citing Carroll v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 410 F. Supp. 234, 238 (W.D. Ky. 1976))
(“[N]either the Kentucky General Assembly nor those individuals responsible for
discharging the duties imposed on them by the state constitution . . . can abrogate those
duties merely because the monetary obligations becomes [sic] unexpectedly large or
onerous.”); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 794 A.2d 744, 754 (N.H. 2002) (rejecting an
administrative rule that excused district compliance with standards for fiscal reasons);
Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995) (reasoning that a lack of
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education, the state has only one choice—to pursue “the constitution-
ally prescribed end.”390 Thus, efforts to do something else, particularly
things that are at odds with the constitutional duty, are illegitimate.
C. The Illegitimacy of Educational Gerrymandering
The key doctrinal question for this Article is whether educational
gerrymandering breaches the foregoing equal protection and state
constitutional principles. Is it possible that politics or gerrymandered
opportunity serves some legitimate goal in education? The general
answer is no. While politics and gerrymandering play an obvious and
permissible role in some other contexts like voting, those factors tend
to be inconsistent with the basic premises of education. As the fol-
lowing subsections discuss: statewide systems of education were origi-
nally designed to be apolitical; the structures through which education
gerrymandering occurs—school districts—exist as a matter of conve-
nience not necessity; and the targeting of any student group as less
worthy or deserving is strictly prohibited by basic equal protection.
1. Apolitical Values
Unlike other areas, politics should not play a role in systems of
education. The voting context, again, provides a helpful point of com-
parison because politics so often play a role there. If politics can play a
role there, why not in education? In voting, courts have struggled to
articulate the precise line between permissible and impermissible ger-
rymandering.391 On one hand, courts have recognized that redis-
tricting is an inherently political exercise in which the controlling
political party draws district lines for the entire state.392 That party
will inevitably draw lines that advantage itself and doing so is not nec-
essarily problematic.393 On the other, a strong case exists that drawing
lines for the sole purpose of burdening or discriminating against cer-
tain voters is unconstitutional.394
financial resources is not a sufficient justification for failing to provide the constitutionally
required educational system).
390 McCleary, 269 P.3d at 248 (quoting Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State
Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1137
(1999)).
391 See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 886 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct.
1916 (2018).
392 Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999).
393 Id.
394 See id. at 547 (describing how drawing district lines predominantly based on race is
impermissible); Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 887 (finding that an intent to entrench the
power of one political party at the expense of another satisfies the intent requirement for
an equal protection claim); Levitt, supra note 23 (arguing that invidious partisan intent
should be sufficient to establish a partisan gerrymandering claim).
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Education, however, does not implicate the same level of ambi-
guity and fine line drawing. Access to education tends far more closely
toward contexts in which politics and gerrymandering play no legiti-
mate role than it does toward voting. Voter redistricting may be an
inherently political process, but education is not. The level of educa-
tion the state should offer on a statewide basis does involve judg-
ments, some of which involve politics, but the question of whether the
state will provide this education to all students is not subject to polit-
ical debate.395 The state is not free to make arbitrary distinctions
among students. It is not, for instance, within the state’s purview to
make political judgments about what regions of the state ought to
receive a decent education or have a better shot at a high-quality edu-
cation than others.396 Again, this prohibition does not mean the net
result of state policy must be absolute equality, but it does mean that
the state cannot legitimately pursue efforts to create inequality. In this
respect, education is far more like the judicial system397 than the
voting system.
The constitutional design of public education is consciously
apolitical. In addition to mandating education, state constitutions iso-
late education decisionmaking from normal political processes in tech-
nical and structural ways. The most significant examples are state
constitutional provisions that require stable sources of statewide
school financing, state level rather than local decisionmaking, and
educational uniformity across the state.398 Beginning in the 1800s, for
instance, state constitutions created a constant source of education
395 See William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 418 (Pa. 2017)
(finding a claim relating to the funding scheme for public education in the state was
justiciable and not a political question). But see Citizens for Strong Sch., Inc. v. Fla. State
Bd. of Educ., 232 So. 3d 1163, 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (finding a similar claim to be
a non-justiciable political question).
396 See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990) (rejecting the state’s argument
that it can underfund some students’ needs simply because their needs are so great or
“cannot be fully met” and writing that “in New Jersey there is no such thing as an
uneducable district, not under our Constitution”).
397 It ought to go without saying, for instance, that while the state might legitimately
charge filing fees to cover the cost of court administration, it could not charge those same
fees if the purpose was to make it harder for some citizens to assert their rights. Access to
the courts is referenced as fundamental in some cases. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
374 (1971). A more nuanced analysis indicates that access to the courts only triggers
heightened scrutiny when the access to the courts intersects with some other fundamental
interest or right. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 449–50 (1973). But the state still
could not set a precise threshold if the purpose was to benefit or disadvantage some
political or other demographic group.
398 See JOHN MATHIASON MATZEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR
EDUCATION: FUNDAMENTAL ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE REGARDING
EDUCATION AS REVEALED BY STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 1776–1929, at 127–32
(1931); Black, supra note 28, at 808–16.
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funding by establishing “common school funds”399 requiring that earn-
ings from state-held land be placed in a common school fund and
reserved solely for public schools.400 Some state constitutions even
dictate the specific method for distributing those funds among
schools.401 The constitutionalization of school funding was meant to
separate education from the year-to-year politics of competing for
resources.
State boards of education and state superintendents similarly
reflect an apolitical structure. Education power could have been
vested at the local level, entirely with the state legislature, or in some
independent state officers. Instead, state constitutions chose the third
option, vesting them with constitutional authority furthered system-
wide rather than regional or local decisionmaking, professional rather
than political judgment, and to remain independent from rather than
beholden to politicians.402 This independent constitutional power
importantly prevents legislatures from altering or taking it.403
2. Districts of Convenience
States’ ability to gerrymander school funding depends on the
existence of school districts. Those districts exist as a pure matter of
convenience, not necessity. Part I detailed the various flaws in state
funding formulas, most of which involve states foisting burdens onto
districts and ignoring the needs of their students. But without school
districts, the state would have to accept all funding burdens and meet
all student needs itself. Likewise, without districts, political competi-
tion between districts would not occur.
399 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. XI, § 10 (proceeds from all new and old state
lands “shall be inviolably appropriated to educational purposes”); id. § 11 (requiring that
one-fifth of general annual state revenues “be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of
public schools”); see also MATZEN, supra note 398, at 129–35 (tracking the new common
school funds in state constitutions).
400 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. XI, § 10; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 4. By
1870, common school funds were included in eighty percent of all states’ constitutions.
MATZEN, supra note 398, at 130 tbl.XX. There were thirty-seven states in the Union as of
1870. See 1870 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/
through_the_decades/fast_facts/1870_fast_facts.html (last visited June 3, 2019).
401 FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 7 (requiring the distribution of funds among
counties based on number of children residing in each county between four and twenty-
one years old).
402 Black, supra note 28, at 815–16.
403 See, e.g., Coyne v. Walker, 879 N.W.2d 520, 544–46 (Wis. 2016). These structures
continue to serve as a basis to strike down legislation that undermines public education and
invades these state officers’ provinces. See, e.g., id. at 546; Matthew Burns, Judge
Temporarily Blocks Law Shifting Power from NC Education Board, WRAL.COM (Dec. 29,
2016), https://www.wral.com/judge-temporarily-blocks-law-shifting-power-from-nc-
education-board/16384139.
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While education has long been delivered through districts, school
districts do not serve any grand constitutional function. Districts exist
for the purpose of administering education, facilitating local input,
and convenience.404 States could just as easily deliver education
without school districts. This point is obvious from variance in school
district structures from state to state. Hawaii delivers education on a
statewide basis without local districts.405 Michigan and Pennsylvania,
conversely, carve up communities into intricate webs of hundreds of
districts.406 North Carolina and Florida operate between these
extremes with roughly one school district per county.407 But even
then, the districts vary tremendously in terms of their population
size.408
The most plausible defense of school districts and, thus, the polit-
ical competition that they make possible is that school districts further
the normative value of local control of education. The Supreme
Court’s acceptance of local control as a justification for funding dis-
parities in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, no doubt, stands as strong sup-
port for the potential legitimacy of educational gerrymandering.409
Moreover, local control theoretically promotes certain positive educa-
tion outcomes.410 This Article does not contest that notion, but rather
the notion that local control and political competition between dis-
tricts serve the same masters.
404 See McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 548 (Mass. 1993)
(“While it is clearly within the power of the Commonwealth to delegate some of the
implementation of the duty to local governments, such power does not include a right to
abdicate the obligation imposed on . . . them by the Constitution.”); Campbell v. State, 907
P.2d 1238, 1272 (Wyo. 1995) (indicating that the state has the power to delegate authority
to districts so long as the constitutional mandates of education are met).
405 Organization, HAW. STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.hawaiipublicschools.org/
ConnectWithUs/Organization/Pages/home.aspx (last visited June 3, 2019).
406 ANDREW J. COULSON, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y, SCHOOL DISTRICT
CONSOLIDATION, SIZE AND SPENDING: AN EVALUATION 27 app. C (2007); Black, supra
note 93, at 423 n.271 (discussing the number of districts in Pennsylvania and how they
differ from other states).
407 N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, FACTS AND FIGURES 2015–16, http://
www.dpi.state.nc.us/docs/fbs/resources/data/factsfigures/2015-16figures.pdf; Black, supra
note 93, at 423 n.271 (comparing North Carolina’s countywide school district pattern to
Pennsylvania’s more fragmented system); School District Data, FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://www.fldoe.org/accountability/data-sys/school-dis-data (last visited June 3, 2019) (one
school district per geographic county).
408 Black, supra note 93, at 423.
409 411 U.S. 1, 49 (1973).
410 Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Education Federalism, 56B EMORY L.J.
125, 131 (2006).
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Local control, as a legitimate goal, entails empowering local com-
munities to support public education and tailor it to their needs.411
Competition between districts, in contrast, has entailed manipulating
education structures, funding, and policies to advantage some commu-
nities in relation to others or to minimize the state’s overall education
responsibilities. These latter goals may appear similar to local control
on the surface, but they are entirely different in motive and effect.
These illicit goals simply operate under the guise of local control
without actually achieving it.412 Educational gerrymandering has the
effect of depriving certain communities of the ability to control educa-
tion. The careful rational basis review in Romer, Plyler, and Moreno
clearly recognizes the distinction between otherwise legitimate
goals—like local control—and illicit goals operating under their
guise.413 Thus, the key response to the local control defense of educa-
tion gerrymandering is to carefully assess whether the gerrymandering
actually promotes those goals rather than illicit ones.
3. Indefensible Educational Disadvantages
Finally, comparisons aside, the illegitimacy of educational gerry-
mandering is common sense when considered in context. As explained
above, equal protection prohibits targeting disadvantaged students
when that targeting is motivated by animus, stereotypes, and dislike.
This simple prohibition in education means that a state cannot pass
legislation that, for instance, bars low-income kids from public school
because it believes they are uneducable or too costly to educate. In
fact, relying on equal protection, federal courts rejected this same jus-
tification for the exclusion of students with disabilities as early as
1972.414 Singling out low-income students for exclusion from a state
411 Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L.
REV. 773, 808 (1992) (discussing the positives and negatives of local control); Laurie
Reynolds, Uniformity of Taxation and the Preservation of Local Control in School Finance
Reform, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1835, 1886 (2007).
412 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 948 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1977) (“[U]nder the facts as alleged the notion of local control was a ‘cruel illusion for the
poor school districts’ due to limitations placed upon them by the system itself.” (quoting
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1260 (Cal. 1971))); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 145–46
(Or. 1976) (describing the drastic differences in educational opportunities between a poor
school district and a wealthy one).
413 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228–29 (1982);
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
414 See Mills v. District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866, 875–76 (D.D.C. 1972) (“If
sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that are
needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be expended equitably in
such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported
education . . . .”).
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program that is generally open to everyone would raise the same
problem. It would also resemble the problem in Romer where the
state excluded homosexuals from the ability to seek legal redress in
Colorado even though everyone else still could.415 The fact that the
state thinks it has a good non-discriminatory reason for these exclu-
sionary policies is beside the point. And in education, where states
have an affirmative state constitutional duty to provide education, the
exclusion is all the more problematic. The state simply cannot offer
any plausible justification—other than exclusion for its own sake—for
the legislation.416
Other disadvantages should also be clearly off-limits. Consider an
example that falls just short of obviously unconstitutional exclusion—
the state places an arbitrary cap on the amount that local districts can
spend on low-income students. The state still grants low-income stu-
dents educational access, but the low spending reduces the quality of
education they will receive. While less egregious in effect, the purpose
is not far removed from complete exclusion. In both instances, the
state is burdening a group of students’ educational access for its own
sake. This sort of motive does not escape rational basis review simply
because it is better disguised or because some other possible motive
might exist.
Legislative actions just short of the foregoing should not escape
scrutiny either. Consider legislation that bars school districts from
providing transportation to students. The state might claim in defense
that it wants to encourage schools to spend the recouped resources on
improving student achievement. However, while improving achieve-
ment is an obviously appropriate goal that could justify budget reallo-
cations,417 rational basis review does not allow the state to pursue
illicit motives through a ruse. If the state’s purpose was to make it
harder for low-income students to attend school, Supreme Court pre-
cedent should treat the legislation as being just as unconstitutional as
the examples noted above.
The Court’s analysis in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno
makes this point clear. In Moreno, Congress indicated that its changes
to the food stamp program were intended to prevent fraud.418 For the
415 Romer, 517 U.S. at 627.
416 See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220; Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876.
417 See, e.g., GI Forum Image De Tejas v. Texas Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667,
679–81 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that standardized testing furthered the state’s goals of
holding schools accountable for student achievement and ensuring all students receive
adequate learning opportunities was legitimate notwithstanding its racially disparate
impact).
418 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535.
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Court to strike down the amendment, it had to identify an illicit
unstated motive.419 Congress did not explicitly prohibit “hippies”
from receiving food stamps,420 but the Court reasoned that no other
motivation could explain the legislation.421 The policy, even if it pre-
vented some fraud, simply did not make sense as a piece of normal
legitimate legislation.
The primary objection to illicit-motive analysis is that it would
require the Court to regularly second-guess the soundness of educa-
tion policy.422 The objection overstates reality. A court could, for
instance, easily uphold a poorly designed and relatively ineffective
attempt to reduce education costs: Even racially disparate impact
alone does not trigger judicial concern.423 Only those policies with a
real underlying purpose to burden a particular group of students are
unconstitutional. Such a motive only becomes obvious when the dis-
parate impact and ineffectiveness are also coupled with stated inten-
tions or rather unusual legislative activity.
While a narrow line, this line drawing is consistent with the
evolving motive analysis in voting. Courts and commentators have
increasingly recognized that certain goals are off-limits and require
courts to strike down otherwise permissible voting districts.424
Scholars and courts alike reason that intent alone is enough to strike
down partisan gerrymandering.425 As the lower court in Whitford rea-
soned, “[w]hatever gray may span the area between acceptable and
excessive, an intent to entrench a political party in power signals an
excessive injection of politics into the redistricting process that
impinges on the representational rights of those associated with the
party out of power.”426 In other words, heavily manipulated, oddly
shaped, and unfair voting districts may be permissible as a general
419 See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887,
902–04 (2012) (“[T]he Court first assessed the narrow congressional aim in passing the
amendment, which the Court determined to be explicitly based on impermissible
animus.”).
420 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533–34 (1973) (quoting the challenged legislation, 7 U.S.C.
§ 2011).
421 Id. at 534, 538.
422 See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(refusing, under rational basis, to wade into issues of educational policy).
423 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(“Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion [v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)] or Yick
Wo [v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)], impact alone is not determinative . . . .”).
424 See Levitt, supra note 23, at 2009–10 (discussing claims of impermissible intent in
areas such as redistricting).
425 Kang, supra note 23; Levitt, supra note 23, at 2024; see, e.g., Benisek v. Lamone, 266
F. Supp. 3d 799, 801–02 (D. Md. 2017), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018).
426 Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 887 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2018).
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principle, but not when they are drawn for illicit reasons. The same
would be true in education, where ineffective education policies
remain constitutional so long as they do not represent efforts to target
certain groups of students for disadvantage.
D. Advantages of a Gerrymandering Framework
1. Revealing Common Practice as Normatively Problematic
An anti-gerrymandering lens can normatively, doctrinally, and
practically reframe school funding and educational quality fights.
Understanding and labeling state funding manipulations as gerryman-
dering casts them as normatively problematic in ways that better reso-
nate with courts and the public. The power of gerrymandering to
change minds is evident in voting. The public response to the public
information campaign has been overwhelming in recent years.427 Even
one of the legislators who had previously favored the vote redis-
tricting plan at issue in Gill v. Whitford changed his mind.428 As he
came to realize and admit, “[l]egislators are picking their constituents
rather than constituents picking their legislators.”429 When that hap-
pens, he said, the effect is “to sort of rob the people of their vote.”430
This inversion of government is one that cannot be normatively
defended.431
Gerrymandering educational opportunity similarly begs for an
explanation in a way that other modern education claims do not.
Plaintiffs may claim, under an adequacy or equity framework, that
their right to education has been violated, but the difference between
spending $7500 per pupil and $8000, for instance, is not one that the
public, or even many judges, immediately grasp.432 They must instead
accept someone else’s judgment regarding adequacy.433 But a legisla-
tive scheme to advantage some communities or disadvantage others
427 See, e.g., Michael Wines, Drive Against Gerrymandering Finds New Life in Ballot
Initiatives , N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/us/
gerrymandering-states.html (discussing enormous support for ballot initiatives to eliminate
partisan gerrymandering).
428 Totenberg, supra note 23.
429 Id.
430 Id.
431 See Kang, supra note 23, at 353 (“The notion that the majority party in government
can actively discriminate against the interests of the opposition violates a basic sensibility
about democratic competition and fairness.”).
432 See BAKER, supra note 3, at 3–5 (discussing the enduring debate surrounding the
importance of school funding and per-pupil expenditures).
433 See, e.g., Jill Ambrose, Note, A Fourth Wave of Education Funding Litigation: How
Education Standards and Costing-Out Studies Can Aid Plaintiffs in Pennsylvania and
Beyond, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 107, 109 (2009) (discussing the prevalence of cost-out
studies in school funding litigation).
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flies in the face of fairness and good government no matter what gov-
ernment benefit is at stake. It does not require further explanation. It
simply requires advocates to reveal that educational gerrymandering
has, in fact, occurred.
2. Clearer and More Intuitive Doctrinal Standards
A gerrymandering framework creates an equal protection and
education clause challenge to forms of behavior previously deemed
legally acceptable. From a federal constitutional perspective, states
have had free rein to operate almost any type of education scheme
they could imagine, regardless of its effect on students.434 At the state
level, courts have recognized claims of inadequate and unequal educa-
tional inputs and outputs,435 but never stopped to consider why states
are failing in their education duties or the possibility that some of the
reasons were obnoxious to the constitution. By ignoring these motiva-
tions and the behaviors they produce,436 courts inadvertently normal-
ized what should be aberrational—both constitutionally and socially.
Gerrymandering, as Part I demonstrates, has simply become the game
that many states play as they navigate the political and constitutional
demands in their state. Directly challenging gerrymandering for what
it is opens constitutional doors that were previously closed.
A gerrymandering framework also offers a solution to courts’
ongoing struggles in adjudicating adequacy and equity claims. The
typical adequacy or equity claim in state court involves difficult educa-
tional evaluations.437 Courts must, for instance, determine what
resources matter most to student outcomes,438 the meaning of an ade-
quate education,439 whether current resources are sufficient to deliver
that education,440 and the extent to which courts can compel partic-
ular remedies.441 The fights between the legislature and the court over
434 See McUsic, supra note 92, at 1342 (discussing the limiting effect federal equal
protection law has had on school finance litigation). So long as the scheme did not involve
intentional racial discrimination, the Federal Constitution presumably provided no
protection. See id. at 1342–44.
435 See, e.g., Weishart, supra note 273, at 529.
436 See Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to Education,
48 GA. L. REV. 949, 1002 (2014) (urging courts to consider the adequacy of inputs and
outcomes in determining “what an ‘adequate education’ means for an individual student”).
437 Id. at 974.
438 See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 332–36 (N.Y.
2003).
439 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Leandro v. State,
488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997); Abbeville v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999).
440 Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 212–13 (Conn.
2010); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 801 N.E.2d at 332–36.
441 Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 393 (N.C. 2004).
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these issues often become the triggering event for gerrymandering to
occur.
Gerrymandering claims do not inherently involve these issues or
call on courts to evaluate matters of degree. Rather, with gerryman-
dering, courts would focus on legislative goals and motivations.
Whether the legislature is doing a good job in providing adequate
educational opportunities is beside the point. The primary question is
whether the legislature is actually trying to do its job or whether,
instead, it is manipulating education to further other illegitimate
goals.442 Shifting to this inquiry would also help address the separation
of power and judicial authority issues that plague the typical school
funding case.443 Articulating clear and consistent rules regarding what
states cannot do, rather than vaguely suggesting the various things a
state must do, would reinforce the court’s internal and external
authority to intervene.444 Intervening on these grounds involves a
much narrower holding than the typical equity or adequacy case.
To be sure, actually discerning legislative intent is not always
easy.445 But the question to be answered regarding legislative intent is
not a matter of degree. It is a black and white question. Given the
nature of the intent a court is searching for, answering the question of
legislative intent is not as difficult as, for instance, identifying racial
motivations.446 The unusualness of gerrymandering itself will tip
courts off to illicit intent,447 and the methods are almost impossible to
hide. Moreover, questions of intent, no matter their difficulty, are
ones that courts have long been charged with answering.448
3. A Check on Otherwise Unlimited Exercises of Power
A gerrymandering framework also responds to the problems
associated with state legislatures’ unlimited exercise of discretion in
education. In the absence of a meaningful federal check, relatively few
442 Bauries, supra note 436, at 986.
443 See, e.g., id. at 986–87.
444 Id.
445 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 2397 (2017).
446 See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (analyzing the changing
nature of discrimination and the difficulty of identifying it).
447 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 768 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
633 (1996) (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37–38 (1928)).
448 See generally Levitt, supra note 23 (exploring how to identify invidious intent in the
context of partisan gerrymandering).
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external limits exist on state education policy.449 In states where state
courts have refused to enforce education clauses, students have no
recourse at all.450 In states where courts have intervened, legislatures
are still often willing to defy and delay state courts’ demands.451 The
past decade has offered signs that things may have gotten worse in
some states.452 A gerrymandering approach has the potential to create
both a federal check and a new tool for state courts themselves. That
check, even if not regularly exercised, should scare states away from
their most problematic tendencies and toward more equitable and
adequate educational policies. The net effect of all the foregoing
improvements would be to achieve the ultimate goal—improved edu-
cational opportunities.
CONCLUSION
For all its past success, state-based litigation has never come close
to breaking states’ bad habits. Even in states where the litigation has
been successful, legislatures are resisting court orders on multiple
fronts, ignoring court orders altogether, dragging out remedies for
years, or doing just enough to get courts off their back before
reverting back to their old ways. The reality of these limitations is best
captured by the simple fact that thirty states spend less on education
today than they did a decade ago. And now, the very concepts of edu-
cational adequacy and equity struggle to retain the doctrinal and nor-
mative force they once had.
These challenges beg for a new solution. Otherwise, the constitu-
tional right to education risks the possibility of a long, tortured decline
analogous to the one the affirmative duty to desegregate experienced
in federal courts. Reconceptualizing education funding failures as
active efforts to gerrymander educational opportunity can be that
449 See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1196 (Ill. 1996) (finding that
school finance issues are nonjusticiable and must be resolved in a “legislative forum rather
than in the courts”).
450 Citizens for Strong Sch., Inc. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., 232 So. 3d 1163, 1165–66 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that adequacy claims “raise political questions not subject to
judicial review, because the relevant constitutional text does not contain judicially
discoverable standards”).
451 See, e.g., Andrew Ujifusa, Kansas Lawmakers OK Shift to Block-Grant Funding, but
Court Fight Looms, EDUC. WK.’S BLOGS: STATE EDWATCH (Mar. 17, 2015), http://
blogs.edweek.org/edweek/state_edwatch/2015/03/kansas_lawmakers_ok_shift_to_block-
grant_funding_but_court_fight_looms.html. The most that some state legislatures have
done to acquiesce is to propose a two-year “time out” while they determine the best course
of action. See, e.g., McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 239 (Wash. 2012); Don Hineman,
House Moves to Repeal School Finance Formula, STATE REPRESENTATIVE DON HINEMAN
(Mar. 14, 2015), http://www.hinemanforkansas.org/newsletters/newsletter-2015-03-14.html.
452 Black, supra note 35, at 427.
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solution. Ample facts demonstrate that states go to extreme lengths to
gerrymander their school funding formulas, even after state supreme
courts have ordered them to fix their school funding failures. The list
of manipulations is so long and so commonplace that scholars and
courts have failed to recognize that the manipulations are actually an
unusual form of legislating. States are picking winners and losers—
and in an area where students possess affirmative rights. When these
failures are understood as gerrymandering, basic equal protection and
state constitutional principles demand that they stop.
